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One way to increase good health outcomes for patients could be to replace human doctors 
(GPs) with artificial intelligence on account of AI’s epistemic superiority. We might think of 
this premise as the replacement thesis. It is widely assumed that good healthcare requires a 
good doctor-patient relationship, and the replacement thesis raises immediate questions around 
the impact of AI upon this relationship. In particular, it is doubtful whether aspects of patient-
centered medicine within this relationship – namely, communication, trust, and empathy – can 
be provided by AI without undermining its corresponding health outcomes. I defend the ethical 
plausibility of the replacement thesis by examining the instrumental value of the aspects of 
communication, trust, and empathy to the end of good health and investigating whether AI can 
– either practically or, where empirical support is absent, in principle – uphold these aspects to 
the extent necessary to secure this outcome. I argue that whilst the parts of communication, 
trust, and empathy that are instrumental towards good health are largely assumable by AI, 
tensions between black-box medicine and patient-centered medicine will need resolved before 
AI can replace human doctors and transform the doctor-patient relationship into the robot-
patient relationship. Resolution of these tensions will support the ethical plausibility of the 
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One way to increase positive health outcomes for patients could be to replace human 
doctors with artificial intelligence (AI). I will refer to this premise as the replacement thesis. 
However, it is widely assumed that good healthcare depends upon a good doctor-patient 
relationship, and it is questionable whether AI can uphold aspects important to this relationship; 
namely, aspects of patient-centered medicine. In this thesis, I aim to make the replacement 
thesis ethically plausible by arguing that these aspects – in particular, communication, trust, 
and empathy – are either unimportant to the end of good healthcare or assumable by AI. 
 
In this chapter, I will contextualise the replacement thesis by outlining past, present, 
and future applications of artificial intelligence in healthcare and describing how the notion of 
replacing human doctors with AI transpired. I will then briefly summarise the current literature 
on this topic and indicate key arguments I will engage with later in this thesis. Following this, 
I will paramaterise my inquiry by explaining what I mean when I refer to the replacement of 




1.1 Past, present, and future applications of AI in healthcare 
 
 
As the field of healthcare undergoes increasing automation, the role of the doctor must 
similarly evolve. As Chastel (2018) describes, “… the medical profession is on the cusp of a 
technological, data-driven revolution: a new frontier of medical automation”. Having once 
been an entirely human-powered undertaking, the role of the doctor is now having to navigate 




Given its capabilities, it seems indisputable that AI will be at the vanguard of this 
revolution (Topol, 2019; McDougall, 2019; Loder and Nicholas, 2018; Yu, Beam and Kohane, 
2018; Hinton, 2018; Jiang et al., 2017; Whitby, 2015). Alan Turing — the founding father of 
AI — defined artificial intelligence as “… the science and engineering of making intelligent 
machines, especially intelligent computer programs” (Turing, 1950, as cited by Loh, 2018). 
Artificial intelligence has also been referred to more informally as “… computers which 
perform cognitive tasks usually associated with human minds, particularly learning and 
problem-solving” (Loder and Nicholas, 2018, p. 11) and, similarly, as “… a computer system 
that can achieve tasks that require making observations, evaluating information and reaching 
decisions” (McDougall, 2019), p. 156). Although there exist many nuanced definitions of AI, 
those of Turing, Loder and Nicholas, and McDougall offer a general, representative overview. 
 
Although AI’s role in healthcare has been incremental thus far, it is expected to 
fundamentally transform the future landscape of healthcare. It is expected that AI could save 
the New Zealand healthcare system $700 million in value and savings by 2026 and address 
20% of unmet clinical demand (AI Forum, 2019). Such potential may be used to address what 
is understood as the ‘iron triangle’ in healthcare whereby the “… three interlocking factors – 
access, affordability, and effectiveness – require inevitable and often negative trade-offs” 
(Forbes, 2019). According to Forbes, there exist three major applications – or ‘zones of 
investment’ – within healthcare that AI is predicted to facilitate: digitisation (making 
operational processes less expensive), engagement (improving upon how patients interact with 
healthcare providers, systems, and services), and diagnostics. It is the zone of engagement – in 
particular, how patients interact with healthcare services – that provides the context for this 
thesis. 
 
AI was first introduced to healthcare in the mid-twentieth century as a medical 
diagnostic decision support system where it was used to extend the preexisting capabilities of 
human diagnosticians (Yu, Beam and Kohane, 2018; Inthorn, Tabacchi and Seising, 2015; 
Miller, 1994). AI’s potential within the life sciences was further explored in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s during the Dendral experiments where it helped identify unknown organic 
molecules in chemistry (Lindsay et al., 1980). Since then, it has been used across a wide range 
of medical applications. For example, deep learning networks are being used to make 
probabilistic estimates regarding breast and skin cancer (and are producing results on par with 
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medical professionals; Jiang et al., 2017).1 They are also being used to detect diabetic 
retinopathy from images (Gulshan et al., 2016), predict pneumonia risk and hospital 
readmissions (Caruana et al., 2015), and facilitate the discovery of new drugs (Ramsundar et 
al., 2015). Through deep learning, doctors have also been able to predict cardiovascular risk 
factors from retinal fundus photographs (Poplin et al., 2018). Further applications include 
predicting treatment pathways, maintaining electronic health records, surgery, triaging, 
biomarker discovery, patient monitoring, practice management, population health 
management, and device integration (amongst many others; see Bjerring and Busch, 2020; 
Hatherley, 2019; McDougall, 2019; Pullen, 2019; Lin, Mahoney and Sinsky, 2019; Houlton, 
2018; Loh, 2018; Yu, Beam and Kohane, 2018). 
 
 Primary care has been identified as a sector “… where the power, opportunity, and 
future of AI [is] most likely to be realised in the broadest and most ambitious scale” (Lin, 
Mahoney and Sinsky, 2019, p. 1626). As technological advancements challenge 
preconceptions of what is possible for AI,  the idea that artificial intelligence might extend its 
reach to the doctor-patient relationship by taking on the role of the doctor is gaining traction 
(see, for example, Topol, 2019; Loder and Nicholas, 2018; Loh, 2018; Susskind and Susskind, 
2016). This raises the prospect of whether AI could replace human doctors entirely. 
 
 Replacing doctors with AI may seem a radical idea, but research demonstrates how the 
technical performance of AI may be superior to that of humans (where technical performance 
refers to practical tasks in medicine that do not involve interpersonal interaction; for example, 
predictive modeling). To illustrate, consider a recent systematic review and meta-analysis that 
demonstrated how AI can correctly diagnose diseases 87% of the time and give a correct all-
clear 93% of the time in comparison to humans who can correctly diagnose diseases 86% of 
the time and give a correct all-clear 91% of the time (Liu et al., 2019). Although this difference 
 
1 Deep learning is a method of machine learning that uses multiple layers of artificial ‘neurons’ to learn a 
hierarchy of complex feature detectors (Hinton, 2018). Deep learning is advantageous for modeling intricate 
relationships between data and outcomes, making it an excellent tool for medicine. For a more comprehensive 
breakdown of deep learning, see Hinton (2018). 
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in performance seems small, even one correct diagnosis that would have otherwise been 
wrongly diagnosed carries significant consequences for the patient in question.2 
 
Ford (2015) also describes how AI are better placed to manage the enormous quantity 
of data produced by new medical research and developments by churning through “… vast 
troves of information in disparate formats and then almost instantly constructing inferences 
that might elude even the most attentive human researcher” (p. 129). Ford argues the 
implausibility of expecting the same performance of humans, receiving support from Curioni-
Fontecedro (2017) who describes how doctors would need to read for approximately twenty 
nine hours each workday to stay up to date with the medical literature. Moreover, the 
performance of deep learning is predicted to improve as data sets increase and computers 
become more powerful (Hinton, 2018). These are but a small handful of reasons why we should 
seriously consider replacing human doctors with AI; as Whitby (2015, p. 224) writes, “there is 
no doubt that AI can perform many of the functions of medical practitioners: largely because 
it is already doing so, in the lab if not in practice”. 
 
The idea of AI assuming the role of the doctor is significantly more controversial than 
its adoption of other tasks such as those listed above. This is because the role of the doctor is 
not measured exclusively by its technical components; rather, it is also characterised by the 
relationship a doctor has with their patients and aspects of patient-centered medicine within 
this relationship (see section 1.4). Hall, Roter and Rand (1981, p. 18) underscore this by 
describing medicine as “… an art whose magic and creative ability have long been recognised 
as residing in the interpersonal aspects of the patient-physician relationship”. Exactly what is 
special – perhaps irreplaceable – about this relationship can be difficult to articulate: as 
Coeckelbergh (2015) frames it (referring to AI as expert medical systems), “… if we replace 
physicians by [AI], it seems that something is lost, although… it is not obvious what precisely 
it is that we miss” (p. 34). He goes on to ask “… is something missing, perhaps something 
‘human’, that… is essential in the case of medicine and healthcare?” (p. 37). It seems to be this 
 
2 A weakness of claims such as this is that little research has directly compared the performance of AI and 
human health professionals on the same data sets, thus limiting the scope of these findings (Bjerring and Busch, 
2020). Nonetheless, from the literature available, we have good reason to believe that AI is as – if not more – 
effective than humans with regards to the speed, accuracy, reliability, and knowledge base in medical prediction 
and diagnostics (see also Loh, 2018; Jiang et al., 2017). 
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presumption of ‘humanness’ that sets the doctor-patient relationship apart from other areas of 
medicine and presents one of the greatest challenges to AI assuming the role of the doctor. 
 
Furthermore, there is a prevalent concern that modern medicine has a “… predominant 
focus on physical, technical and statistical aspects of disease and treatment and a neglect of 
psycho-social and existential issues and individual patients’ needs” (Heusser et al., 2012, p. 
455). In light of these concerns, it is understandable why the idea of implementing AI – which 
is projected to accentuate these physical, technical, and statistical aspects of disease – has been 
met with resistance (see also Hart, 2018). By shifting from a doctor-patient relationship to, as 
it were, a robot-patient relationship, the question of whether AI can achieve good health 
outcomes without undermining aspects of patient-centered medicine within the doctor-patient 
relationship becomes paramount. Thus, the feasibility of replacing human doctors with AI will 
depend to a large extent upon AI's ability to preserve aspects of patient-centered medicine 
within the doctor-patient relationship that are associated with good healthcare. 
 
As I shall expand upon in section 1.3, previous research on the replacement thesis has 
been conservative. There are limited examples of AI adopting interpersonal responsibilities of 
the doctor despite its recognised potential in this area. This gap in research presents an 
opportunity to explore the extent to which the replacement thesis is plausible and to identify 
its most significant ethical challenges. These challenges are identified with a view to try to 
minimise the ethical and practical tensions that may derive from future replacement. The 
following section reviews some of the key discussions around this topic and further 
underscores the relevance of this research. 
 
 
1.2 Current literature 
 
 
Primary concerns around replacing human doctors with AI commonly regard AI’s 
ability to meet interpersonal expectations in the doctor-patient relationship. In this section, I 
will review some key arguments in the literature which I will then expand on in later chapters. 
 
Key figures in this debate are Richard and Daniel Susskind. In their 2016 book The 
Future of the Professions, Susskind and Susskind predict that machines will come to replace 
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human professionals on account of their increasing capabilities. They anticipate several 
possible objections to the automation of the professions, three of which I will briefly summarise 
on account of their relevance to the role of the doctor. One objection assumes that automation 
will thwart the positive effects of face-to-face, one-to-one interactions between doctors and 
patients. Another argues that by replacing human professionals with machines, we will remove 
the trust inherent to the profession. A third claims that machines are necessarily incapable of 
empathy and therefore will never be able to replace humans in roles where empathy is a 
fundamental requirement. 
 
Susskind and Susskind respond to these three objections by appealing to the idea that, 
ultimately, the moral permissibility of automation is dictated by its instrumentality towards the 
end goal of the professions. For Susskind and Susskind, this end goal is access to professional 
expertise. Thus, the three objections are only a problem if it can be shown that personal 
interaction, trust, and empathy are a) necessary conditions to access professional expertise that 
are b) exclusive to humans. In the context of healthcare where the role of the doctor is 
vulnerable to automation, Susskind and Susskind argue that personal interaction (that is, 
human-human interaction), trust, and empathy are not necessary conditions for patients to 
access medical expertise nor can they only be embodied by humans. 
 
Within a health context, research on the automation of personal interaction (or 
communication, as I have reframed it) has explored how AI might enhance the communication 
of health information with patients. For example, Kreps and Neuhauser (2013) have 
investigated how AI might address shortcomings of eHealth communication programs, 
concluding that AI can improve the immediacy of information and make health communication 
more “… engaging, relevant, exciting, and actionable” (p. 205) for patients. Hudlicka (2013) 
has also examined whether a Virtual Mindfulness Coach can facilitate patient education, 
counseling, and health behaviour training and coaching within a mindfulness meditation 
program. From a pilot evaluation study, Hudlicka concluded that the Virtual Mindfulness 
Coach was “… both feasible, and potentially more effective, than a self-administered program” 
(p. 160), noting that further advantages included improved accessibility and cost-effectiveness. 
However, despite these positive findings for the communicative capabilities of AI, it has been 
identified that dynamic communication – that is, the ability to incorporate newly acquired 
information into the present interaction – poses a significant challenge for AI replacement 
(Guzman and Lewis, 2020). Although several authors have outlined the instrumentality of 
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dynamic communication to the clinical encounter – particularly in the interests of explicating 
patients’ values and preferences (see, for example, Epstein and Gramling, 2013) – how AI 
might meet these requirements is unclear. 
 
Ethical issues around trust and empathy in the doctor-patient relationship have also 
been explored in considerable depth (see, for example, Di Nucci, 2019; Liyanage et al., 2019). 
Occasionally, these issues have been examined within the context of AI. Hatherley (2020), for 
example, has addressed anxieties around the effect AI will have on trust in clinical practice, 
arguing that we can rely upon but not trust AI (in the moral sense of the word). Nundy, 
Montgomery and Wachter (2019) have also considered how trust can be preserved in an 
increasingly technologised doctor-patient relationship. As these authors demonstrate, one 
means to preserve trust is to improve transparency in how machines make and justify their 
clinical decisions. However, this constraint proves challenging when we consider the current 
capabilities of AI and may present a reasonable obstacle to the replacement thesis. 
 
Empathy is another focal point for roboticists and computer scientists. Numerous 
studies have shown how machines can be programmed to behave empathetically towards 
humans: for example, Leite et al. (2013) have demonstrated how a robot can use verbal 
utterances and facial expressions to successfully convey empathetic affective states reflecting 
chess players’ performances. Similarly, De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (2017) have described 
how machines might cognitively represent empathy so as to behave in such a way towards 
users. Despite these indications that empathetic behaviour can be successfully conveyed by 
machines, few studies have explored applications within a medical context such as within the 
doctor-patient relationship. Moreover, there is the question of whether this empathy is real in 
any affective sense. McStay (2018) has argued that this is not the question we should be asking. 
Through his model of machinic verisimilitude – that is, how a machine can appear to 
understand how humans think and feel even if this understanding is not real – McStay claims 
that if behavioural empathy secures the same positive outcomes as ‘real’ empathy (i.e. empathy 
experienced by humans), then its authenticity is morally insignificant. 
 
The above research provides a foundation for first assessing the importance of aspects 
of patient-centered medicine in the doctor-patient relationship, and secondly, examining AI’s 
capacity to preserve these aspects. In this thesis, I adapt Susskind and Susskind’s argument to 
establish the measure by which I assess the importance of these aspects: instrumentality 
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towards the end goal of good health outcomes.3 I further expand upon their arguments 
regarding personal interaction (communication), trust, and empathy by applying these three 
aspects to the profession of the doctor. For example, when considering trust, I borrow from 
Hatherley’s claim that we can rely upon but not trust AI to argue that reliance is sufficient for 
the purposes of the doctor-patient relationship. Similarly, I use Nundy, Montgomery and 
Wachter’s research to further explore the relationship between trust and transparency (the latter 
posing a significant problem for AI). With regards to empathy, I demonstrate the plausibility 
of programming empathetic behaviour into a machine by describing studies by Leite et al. and 
De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra, and subsequently address moral objections to this 
‘performance’ of empathy through McStay’s machinic verisimilitude. 
 
The following section will expand upon the scope of this thesis including why I am 
interested in the replacement of human doctors with AI as opposed to their supplementation, 
why I am focusing on GPs rather than doctors across all areas of medicine, and what AI 
replacement may actually look like. 
 
 
1.3 Scope of this thesis 
 
 
For my inquiry, I am concerned with the replacement of human doctors with AI, as 
opposed to supplementation whereby AI would extend and augment humans’ abilities. Whilst 
this position is – to some extent – consistent with the likes of Susskind and Susskind (2016),4 
it contrasts with many others. For example, Jiang et al. (2017, p. 230) remark that “… human 
physicians will not be replaced by machines in the foreseeable future, but AI can definitely 
assist physicians to make better clinical decisions or even replace human judgement in certain 
 
3 By contrast, Susskind and Susskind hold the end goal (of the professions) to be access to practical expertise. 
Although slightly different, this overlaps with my end goal in that good healthcare cannot be secured without 
access to practical medical expertise.  
4 Whilst Susskind and Susskind predict that most professions will become fully automated, in their book they do 
not specifically claim that the profession of the doctor will be. However, it is worth noting that in an interview, 
Daniel Susskind (2016) – who cowrote The Future of the Professions – commented: “maybe there will come a 
time when a patient goes to a doctor and it would be negligent for the doctor not to use a machine that could 
predict the outcome of any given treatment plan more accurately than they could themselves”. 
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functional areas of healthcare”. Likewise, Lin, Mahoney and Sinsky (2019, p. 1628) argue that 
“for AI to add the most value and for physicians to embrace it, these innovations should 
support, not supplant, the patient-physician relationship”. Similar projections have been made 
by the Medical Council of New Zealand (2020), Topol (2019), Krittanawong (2018), Chastel 
(2018), Stead (2018), Inthorn, Tabacchi and Seising (2015) and Shapshay (2014) with the latter 
arguing that AI cannot recreate the therapeutic value of the doctor-patient relationship. Other 
researchers – such as Loder and Nicholas (2018), Loh (2018), and London (2018) – have flirted 
with the idea that AI could eventually supplant human doctors, but exploration of this idea has 
been thus far conservative.5 
 
I have opted to pursue the replacement thesis over a more moderate approach (such as 
AI supplementation) as it is my intention to test the strongest form of the claim that AI can take 
on the responsibilities of the doctor. As has been indicated in section 1.1, supplementation is 
already happening and is likely to increase. By contrast, replacement is likely far off and has 
the most challenges to overcome. However, regardless of whether researchers agree or disagree 
that machines will replace or supplement human doctors, there seems to be the consensus that 
the role of the doctor will undergo significant technological change as healthcare becomes 
increasingly automated.  
 
When I propose replacing human doctors with AI, I am referring specifically to general 
practitioners. GPs tend to be the first (if not only) point of contact for many patients, and thus 
– as gatekeepers of healthcare – play a significant role in both the patient experience and 
realisation of positive health outcomes. McWhinney (1996) discusses several ways in which 
general practice differs from other disciplines, two of which I will briefly describe here. For 
one, general practice places a heavier emphasis on its relationships (in particular, the doctor-
patient relationship). As the focal point of my inquiry, this emphasis makes general practice a 
particularly appropriate discipline to study. Furthermore, general practice can differ from other 
disciplines in that it adopts an “… organismic rather than a mechanistic metaphor of biology” 
 
5 An exception would be Goldhahn of Goldhahn, Rampton and Spinas (2018), who briefly claims that “doctors 
as we now know them will become obsolete… [AI] will outperform human physicians in many ways” (p. 1-2). 
London (2018) also cautions that “… we must be aware of romanticising human judgement… when human and 
machine intelligence seek to perform the same task, we must be prepared to use whichever approach offers the 
best prospect of more accurate and reliable performance on that task”. 
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(p. 434), by which it is meant that general practice approaches the human body in such a way 
that recognises how behaviour “… cannot be explained or predicted solely by applying the 
general laws of science… [but rather] its history and its context or environment” (p. 434). This 
approach embodies central tenets of patient-centered medicine and is compatible with the 
normative framework through which I make my argument. This framework will be expanded 
upon in the following section. 
 
Finally, it is worth considering what AI doctors might look like. What form would they 
take? What sort of clinical consultation would take place, and where? Although we cannot 
accurately predict the answers to these questions, I anticipate that AI doctors are likely to take 
the form of some sort of embodied conversational interface (ECA). ECAs are virtual AI 
interfaces that typically assume a humanoid appearance. I am confident that the interface will 
be characteristically human because research has repeatedly demonstrated that a humanoid 
form facilitates intuitive social interactions between machines and humans (Bartnek et al., 
2009; Breazeal and Scassellati, 1999; Brooks et al., 1999). Further research on the 
anthropomorphisation of machine-human interaction can be found in section 2.2 of chapter 
two. ECAs also re-emerge in chapter two when I describe a study by Hudlicka (2013) 
investigating AI’s capacity to dynamically communicate with patients. Ultimately, because we 
cannot know for sure how AI doctors will emerge, I proceed with this thesis in a more abstract 
and general way; that is, refraining – to the extent possible – from engaging with arguments 
that hinge upon these specifics. For example, an AI doctor that can be accessed remotely raises 
different issues to an AI doctor that can only be accessed through physical attendance at a 
clinic; particular issues like these are outside of the scope of my thesis. Thus, I proceed under 
the speculative assumption that replacing human doctors with AI means patients must interact 
with some sort of virtual interface, effectively transforming the doctor-patient relationship into 
the robot-patient relationship. 
 
 
1.4 Methodological approach 
 
 
In this thesis, I appeal to patient-centered medicine, a normative model of the doctor-
patient relationship. Patient-centered medicine (or patient-centered care, as it is also referred 
to) is often identified as being at the core of modern primary care (Boudreau, Cassell and Fuks, 
11 
 
2018; Delaney, 2018; Hashim, 2017; Marzorati and Pravettoni, 2017; Dill and Gumpert, 2012; 
Hudon et al., 2011; Fuertes et al., 2007; Holman and Lorig, 2000; Mead and Bower, 2000; 
Laine and Davidoff, 1996). As Brody (1987, p. 59) puts it, “… the concept of patient-centered 
primary care can be reduced to one simple idea: the primary-care physician’s approach to the 
patient’s problem is grounded in the way the patient himself defines the problem”. Patient-
centeredness seeks to move beyond the traditional biomedical model by integrating 
psychological, social, cultural, and biological factors into the doctor-patient relationship. 
Through patient-centered medicine, doctors can develop long-term therapeutic relationships 
with their patients that bring patients’ personalities, needs, and wider psychosocial contexts 
into the forefront of their care (Bjerring and Busch, 2020; Delaney, 2018; Stewart, 2001; Mead 
and Bower, 2000). These attributes then guide the clinical interaction. 
 
Patient-centered medicine places heavy emphasis on the values and preferences of 
patients (Delaney, 2018; Marzorati and Pravettoni, 2017; Mead and Bower, 2000). In a medical 
context, values give decisions “… meaning, significance, and moral worth… [and] underpin 
different priorities and different kinds of ethical judgements” (Kelly et al., 2015, p. 2). 
Similarly, preferences can be thought of as “… statements by individuals regarding the relative 
desirability of a range of health experiences, treatment options and health states” (Brennan and 
Strombom, 1998, p. 259; see also Bensing et al., 2000). Marzorati and Pravettoni (2017) 
describe preferences as falling under the “… conceptual label of value, becoming like a 
constellation of principles with an important role in life” (p. 104). An individual’s value system 
informs their identity as a person and constructs the lens through which they perceive the world 
(Kelly et al., 2015; Meissner, 1996). Clinical decision-making – an inherently value-laden 
process – therefore requires value judgements for what treatment might be most appropriate 
for the patient. Values can thus be understood as normative guidelines for clinical decision-
making (see Marzorati and Pravettoni, 2017; Kelly et al., 2015). As McDougall (2019, p. 157) 
elaborates, “the key idea is that different medical decisions are right for different people based 
on [their] values” [emphasis removed]. Halligan (2008) describes how patients often find the 
healthcare experience unpleasant not because of a lack of care or professionalism on behalf of 
health professionals, but because of the lack of values reflected in healthcare systems and 
decision-making processes. Such a deficit can leave patients feeling “powerless, frustrated and 




There is much empirical support for the benefits of patient-centered medicine. For 
example, Ekman et al. (2012) and Bertakis and Azari (2011) have demonstrated that patient-
centered medicine leads to improved health outcomes and increased patient satisfaction with 
their healthcare. Bertakis and Azari also found that a patient-centered approach reduces 
hospitalization rates. Similarly, Hermanns et al. (2013) have shown how the length of hospital 
stays and readmissions rates are decreased under a patient-centered framework. Thompson and 
McCabe (2012) and Roumie et al. (2011) have shown patient-centered medicine to increase 
patient adherence to treatment plans, and considerable research indicates the overall 
improvement of patient experiences under a patient-centered approach (see the literature 
review by Delaney, 2017). Patient-centered medicine is also found to promote collaborations 
in care planning between doctor and patient, and to decrease perceived suspicion and secrecy 
regarding medical decision-making (Delaney, 2017). Finally, Sidani, Epstein and Miranda 
(2006) have shown patient-centered medicine to improve medical decision-making and 
feelings of patient empowerment. 
 
A realisation of patient-centered medicine is the therapeutic alliance (or ‘working 
alliance’, as it is also referred to): a framework favorable for maximising positive outcomes 
within the doctor-patient relationship (Boeckxstaens, 2020; Sturgiss et al., 2019; Luxton, 2014; 
Dill and Gumpert, 2012; Fuertes et al., 2007; Johnson and Wright, 2002; Mead and Bower, 
2000; Bordin, 1979). Although this construct was first examined within a psychotherapeutic 
context by the psychiatrist Ralph Greenson (1967), the model is transferable to the doctor-
patient relationship within general practice.6 Sturgiss et al. (2019) have demonstrated this 
transferability through the development of a measure for primary care called the WAI-GP 
(Working Alliance Inventory – General Practice). This model expands upon the original WAI 
(Working Alliance Inventory; as developed by Bordin, 1979) which measures the alliance 
between psychotherapist and patient and associates a higher score with better clinical outcomes 
(Leibert and Dunne-Bryant, 2015; Elvins and Green, 2008). Research indicates a correlation 
between the WAI-GP and increased patient satisfaction and intent to adhere to treatment (Chan, 




6 For a genealogy of the therapeutic alliance, see Elvins and Green (2008). 
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The therapeutic alliance is generally held to involve three key dimensions: an affective 
dimension, a goal-oriented dimension, and an action-oriented dimension. The affective 
dimension describes the emotional depth of the relationship between doctor and patient whilst 
the goal-oriented and action-oriented dimensions generally describe goal-setting and decision-
making processes during the clinical encounter (all of which overlap considerably). As the 
therapeutic alliance is a multifaceted concept that has been discussed in different ways, authors 
have referred to these three dimensions using different terms.7 For example, Boeckxstaens et 
al. (2020) have referred to the affective dimension broadly as the affective bond whilst Dill and 
Gumpert (2012) and Fuertes (2008) have characterised it as, respectively, an emotional 
connection or emotional bond. Mead and Bower (2000) have described this “personal bond” 
as comprising “… empathy, congruence, and unconditional positive regard” (p. 1090), and 
Luxton (2014) has similarly highlighted trust and empathy as key aspects of this dimension. 
Regarding the goal-oriented and action-oriented dimensions, Boeckxstaens et al. (2020), 
Sturgiss et al. (2019), Fuertes et al. (2007) and Mead and Bower (2000) have highlighted the 
importance of agreement between doctor and patient on treatment goals and the interventions 
necessary to attain these. 
 
As with patient-centered medicine, further benefits are associated with the therapeutic 
alliance.8 For example, there is an association between doctor-patient relationships 
characterised by a therapeutic alliance and positive health outcomes (Ferreira et al., 2013; 
Elvins and Green, 2008; Bachelor, 1991). Furthermore, patients’ perceptions of the therapeutic 
alliance are positively correlated with their perceptions of treatment value (Fuertes et al., 2007). 
A link was also found between the therapeutic alliance and adherence self-efficacy (patients’ 
ability to manage challenges such as medication side effects and routine change; Fuertes et al., 
2007; see also Johnson et al., 2006). Where a therapeutic alliance has been established between 
doctor and patient, doctors find that they are better placed to address psychosocial components 
of pain which may be overlooked during diagnosis (Gatchel et al., 2007), and moreover, 
 
7 Bordin (1979) has emerged as a prevalent influence amongst conceptualisations of the therapeutic alliance (in 
particular, Boeckxstaens et al., 2020; Sturgiss et al., 2019; Dill and Gumpert, 2012; Fuertes et al., 2007; 
Thompson and Wright, 2002). 
8 Owing to the multifaceted nature of the therapeutic alliance, it may be that some of the benefits associated with 




research investigating chronic lower back pain found that the therapeutic alliance can 
significantly modulate perceived muscular pain intensity and sensitivity (Fuentes et al., 2014). 
 
Important aspects of patient-centered medicine and the therapeutic alliance are 
communication, trust, and empathy (see, for example, Luxton, 2014; Mead and Bower, 2000). 
It is generally held that these aspects should be preserved as the nature of the role of the doctor 
– as well as the doctor-patient relationship – undergoes change, and the assumed inability of 
AI to preserve them may present an argument against the replacement thesis. However, that is 
not to say that we should simply take what are held to be important aspects and see whether AI 
can embody them. It is of little use to us if AI preserves aspects that are ultimately insignificant 
(or worse, harmful) to the end of good health.9 My intention is therefore not only to explore 
AI’s ability to preserve these aspects within the doctor-patient relationship but to first assess 
their moral significance with a view to determining whether they should be preserved at all. I 
consider an aspect to be justified if it is conducive towards the end goal of good health (whereby 
the doctor-patient relationship is instrumentally valuable towards this end). The end goal of 
good health is compatible with that of patient-centered medicine and supports most accounts 
of the instrumental value of the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
A further defining characteristic of my research is its deflationary nature. By this I mean 
that I aim to separate concepts (in this case, the three aspects of communication, trust, and 
empathy) from their perceived moral character. I do this with a view to identifying what I 
believe to be ultimately at stake when we consider replacing human doctors with AI: good 
healthcare (that is, healthcare that is good for patients).10 In a context such as the doctor-patient 
relationship where failing to meet this goal may hold significant consequences for patient 
 
9 It is also worth consideration that there may be aspects of the doctor-patient relationship that are valued when 
doctors are human but that would serve little purpose in the context of AI. It may be the case that, because of 
their disposition, AI are simply incapable of acting unethically. We might therefore concede the possibility that 
whilst some of these aspects do matter at present, they may not be of moral import in a future where human 
doctors have been replaced by AI. This is an idea that will re-emerge in chapter three when I argue that trust is 
not a useful expectation of AI when they can serve the purposes of the doctor-patient relationship through 
reliability alone (that is, reliably producing good health outcomes). 
10 There are many different interpretations of what good health entails, though for the purposes of this thesis, I 
adopt that advanced by the World Health Organisation (2020). WHO describe health as “… a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. 
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welfare, it is imperative that we do not preserve the apparent intrinsic value of these concepts 
at good healthcare’s expense. Separating aspects from their perceived intrinsic value allows us 
to ask: what purpose do these aspects serve for achieving good health? Can this outcome still 
be achieved without these aspects? If not, to what extent do these aspects rely on humans? Such 
questions parallel the deflationary approach taken by Susskind and Susskind (2016) in The 
Future of the Professions and provide a normative agenda for my argument. 
 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
 
To examine the ethical plausibility of AI replacement, this thesis will include three 
main chapters exploring the respective aspects of communication, trust, and empathy as 
represented in the doctor-patient relationship. Each chapter will follow the same approximate 
structure of identifying exactly what each of these aspects entail before determining whether 
they are instrumentally valuable towards the end of good health. Next, each chapter will 
examine whether AI can uphold these aspects to the extent necessary to achieve this outcome. 
I will conclude each chapter by discussing primary challenges presented by communication, 
trust, and empathy, and – where possible – indicate how AI might negotiate these challenges 
to defend the plausibility of the replacement thesis. 
 
In the final chapter, I will briefly revisit key points of my argument before 
acknowledging limitations of my work. Following this, I will note some directions for further 





















An obvious implication of replacing human doctors with AI is that the doctor-patient 
relationship loses a defining characteristic of human-human interaction. The idea of a patient 
relating to an AI interface rather than a human doctor raises immediate questions around the 
impact upon doctor-patient communication: an aspect commonly regarded as necessary to both 
a good doctor-patient relationship and good healthcare. 
 
I begin this chapter by outlining the importance of communication to the therapeutic 
outcomes associated with the doctor-patient relationship and patient-centered medicine, and 
identify the major challenge AI will face in interacting with patients: dynamic communication. 
Subsequently, I examine the scale of this challenge by presenting a study exploring AI’s 
capacity for dynamic communication, and apply these findings to the doctor-patient 
relationship. I proceed to highlight three further problems that AI will need to navigate when 
communicating with patients, particularly whilst engaging in the goal-setting and decision-
making dimensions of the therapeutic alliance. I conclude that although dynamic 
communication is unlikely to pose an insurmountable challenge to the attainment of positive 
health outcomes within the doctor-patient relationship, the opaque nature of AI will challenge 
normative ideals of explainability in patient-centered medicine. 
 
 
2.1 An overview of communication in the doctor-patient relationship 
 
 
Communication has been identified as a valuable tool for achieving the goals of patient-
centered medicine (Hashim, 2017; Fong Ha and Longnecker, 2010; Bakić-Mirić and Bakić, 
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2008; Swensen et al., 2004; Michie, Miles and Weinman, 2003; Bensing et al., 2000). In 
particular, it is necessary for enabling doctors to better understand patients’ values, preferences, 
expectations, feelings, and beliefs. Bensing et al. (2000, p. 1) have gone as far as to describe it 
as the “royal pathway to patient-centered medicine”. In a randomised study, Swensen et al. 
(2004) found that a majority of patients who participated preferred patient-centered 
communication styles to a “… more traditional, direct communication style” (p. 1075). These 
findings were also supported by Hashim (2017) and Krupat, Yeager and Putnam (2000). 
 
Hashim (2017) proposes five chronological stages of patient-centered communication 
(as enacted within the GP consultation). First, the doctor must elicit the patient’s agenda 
through interviewing techniques. Then, they must proceed to understand the patient’s own 
perspective on their presenting complaints. Striving to understand the patient’s perspective 
represents a fundamental tenet within patient-centered medicine and also provides the doctor 
with further diagnostic clues. After this, the doctor should express empathy (both verbally 
and/or non-verbally) for the patient.11 Having done this, the doctor should then reveal a clinical 
diagnosis. Here, Hashim cautions that inappropriate communication of this diagnosis (for 
example, speaking in a terse manner) can impose psychological harm upon the patient. 
Although there is limited empirical evidence on appropriate strategies for communicating 
grave diagnoses, Hashim recommends that doctors try to assess the patient’s level of pre-
existing knowledge of the illness as well as any preference for how they would like the 
diagnosis communicated. Moreover, doctors should give the patient sufficient time to process 
the information. Finally, doctor and patient should engage in shared decision-making to help 
the patient make more informed choices about their treatment options (a step reflected in the 
action-oriented dimension of the therapeutic alliance as discussed in the previous chapter). 
Whilst helping the patient to make decisions, the doctor should refrain from overwhelming 
them with information. 
 
By communicating effectively, doctors are better able to gather information to facilitate 
accurate diagnosis and foster a more caring doctor-patient relationship (see Street et al., 2009; 
Fong Ha and Longnecker, 2010). A meta-analysis conducted by Zolnierek and DiMatteo 
(2009) found that effective communication between doctor and patient improved patient 
adherence whilst Michie, Miles and Weinman (2003) identified a link between doctor-patient 
 
11 The subject of empathy in the doctor-patient relationship will be explored in chapter four. 
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communication and positive physical health outcomes.12 Additional benefits of patient-
centered communication are the improved regulation of patient uncertainty and emotions and 
improved understanding of medical information for patients which facilitates shared decision-
making (Street et al., 2009; see also Fong Ha and Longnecker, 2010). 
 
Several different factors contribute to deficits in effective communication. For 
example, even though effective communication has been recognised to generally improve 
patient comprehension of health information (see Fong Ha and Longnecker, 2010), doctors 
may still struggle to successfully convey complex medical information (Kreps and Neuhauser, 
2013; see also Green et al., 2013). Research also indicates that doctors’ uncertainty about 
prognostic accuracy can interfere with effective communication (Clayton et al., 2005). 
Similarly, doctors tend to be overly optimistic when sharing prognoses as they may be 
concerned about harming the patient if a bleak prognosis turns out to be wrong (Christakis, 
2001). Some doctors may also avoid discussions with patients around the social and emotional 
impact of their illness as doctors may not feel that they have sufficient time to do so and/or 
may not feel that they can cope with the distressing nature of such conversations (Maguire and 
Pitceathly, 2002). Avoidance of these discussions may lead to patients feeling unable to 
disclose problems with their doctor, which may then interfere with their recovery. 
 
There is also evidence to suggest that some doctors overestimate their communicative 
capabilities. In a study by Tongue, Epps and Forese (2005), 75% of the orthopaedic surgeons 
surveyed perceived themselves to communicate satisfactorily with their patients whereas only 
21% of patients perceived communication with their surgeon to be satisfactory. Such findings 
are consistent with prior research that has shown patients desire better communication with 
their doctors (see Fong Ha and Longnecker, 2010). McBride et al. (1994) similarly found that 
patients often find their doctors’ communication skills to be unsatisfactory despite considering 
communication to be one of the three top capabilities their doctor should have. When a failure 
in communication occurs, patients are less receptive to health recommendations and 
interventions (Kreps et al., 2011). Moreover, because communication is a two-way process, it 
is important that the doctor is able to “… engage the patient’s interest and trust, to elicit and 
 
12 See also Ishikawa, Hashimoto and Kiuchi (2013), Mauksch et al. (2008), Bickmore, Gruber and Picard (2005) 
and Swensen et al. (2004) for further evidence supporting the link between effective/patient-centered 
communication and health outcomes. 
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interpret information from the patients, to monitor their comprehension and state of mind, and 
to tailor the on-going exchange appropriately” (Neuhauser and Kreps, 2003, as cited by Green 
et al., 2013, p. 139). 
 
Communication is a primary tool for securing the benefits of patient-centeredness and 
patient-centered medicine. If AI is to assume the role of the doctor, it will need to communicate 
with patients in such a way that does not undermine these benefits (and is better – or at least as 
good as – the communicative capabilities of human doctors). The next section will present a 
brief summary of communicative AI including its current capabilities and opportunities to 
improve communication within a medical context. I will then describe a study by Hudlicka 
(2013) demonstrating how AI might overcome the challenge of dynamic communication (that 
is, communicating in such a way that accommodates new information that becomes available 
throughout the interaction). 
 
 
2.2 AI and the challenge of dynamic communication 
 
 
“In design and function,” write Guzman and Lewis (2020, p. 72-72), “AI technologies 
are positioned as increasingly complex and life-like communication partners”. Findings for the 
communicative abilities of AI are optimistic with some researchers arguing that AI is beginning 
to demonstrate interactive capabilities that surpass not only those of previous technologies but 
that of humans too (see Peter and Kühne, 2018). By recording users’ communicative habits, 
AI can compare this data with that of millions of other data points gathered from other users to 
personalise interaction (Reeves, 2016). To briefly illustrate its realism, when Google 
introduced an AI system in its Duplex feature that communicated with users using a realistic 
human voice, so much criticism was received that Google re-programmed the system to 
identify itself as AI (Statt, 2018).13 Of course, AI in a communicatory role is not a novel idea; 
there are currently many AI systems that people interact with on a daily basis. Perhaps the most 
recognisable example is Apple’s Siri, an AI operating system that “… consists of a natural 
 
13 This outcry was intensified by the fact that Google had programmed the AI to use fillers such as ‘uh’ and 




language user interface that can understand and process spoken commands and inquiries in a 
number of languages, a voice synthesis output device that supplies audible responses, and an 
impressive backend that is able to interact with and perform queries on both the local device 
and Internet-based data sources” (Gunkel, 2012, p. 19).14 
 
Like Siri, there have emerged many ways in which AI can be programmed to enhance 
robot-human communication. For example, Nass and Brave (2005) have shown how giving AI 
a voice can trigger affirmative, human-like responses towards devices. Similarly, Eyssel and 
Hegel (2012) have demonstrated that gendering machines (e.g. by giving them a male/female 
name or voice) further anthropomorphises technology and increases the likelihood that users 
will respond positively. Research by Morkes, Kernal and Nass (1998) suggests that users tend 
to like computers more when they communicate in a humorous manner. In a qualitative study 
on users’ perceptions of a telephone-based health behaviour intervention system, Kaplan, 
Farzanfar and Friedman (2003) found that users described the system in terms such as ‘friend’, 
‘helper’, and ‘mentor’ as though they had shared a personal relationship with it.15 
 
Within a medical context, AI can be programmed to enhance communication with 
patients by avoiding the use of complex medical jargon and instead using more layperson-
friendly terminology (Kreps and Neuhauser, 2013). Programming of this nature addresses the 
challenge whereby doctors may struggle to communicate health information to patients who 
do not come from a medical background. AI can also be programmed to ask the patient whether 
they understand the information given (including the option to clarify and elaborate if/where 
needed) and to answer any questions the patients may have (see Hudlicka, 2013). Similarly, AI 
should request patient participation when making decisions regarding treatment planning (key 
for the action-oriented dimension of the therapeutic alliance) and should encourage patients to 
express their opinions and concerns at every stage of the consultation, ensuring that the 
interaction is patient-centered. Additional communicative deficits identified in the previous 
section – for example, those prompted by diagnostic/prognostic uncertainty or optimism, 
deteriorating communication skills, and the avoidance of difficult conversations – may be 
 
14 A natural language user interface is a form of language processing that allows AI to interpret and respond to 
human language through analysis of its structure, syntax, semantics etc. For an additional illustration of natural 
language processing, see Hudlicka’s (2013) study in section 2.2.1. 
15 For further instances of positive robot-human communication, see Bickmore, Gruber and Picard (2005). 
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eliminated through removal of the human vulnerabilities that originally give rise to these 
deficits. 
 
Despite these positive advances in AI’s communicative abilities, the perceived 
challenge for AI is that communication is a dynamic (rather than linear) process and – 
historically – dynamic interaction has not been one of AI’s strengths (Guzman and Lewis, 
2020). In order to communicate appropriately and successfully – and to satisfy principles of 
patient-centered medicine whereby new information about patients becomes available 
throughout the clinical encounter – AI must progressively learn about the patient with whom 
they are communicating and alter their interactions accordingly. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I draw upon research by Hudlicka (2013) demonstrating 
how an ‘embodied conversational agent’ (ECA) can maintain effective dynamic 
communication with its user. An ECA is an AI interface that can interact with human users 
through a variety of different communicative capabilities. These include (but are not limited 
to) text-based, multiple-choice user input to text-based character output. ECAs can also 
demonstrate “affective and social realism” (Hudlicka, p. 161). In her study, Hudlicka focuses 
on relational pedagogical agents – a subgroup of ECAs – which are advantageous for teaching 
a particular topic or skill as well as the development of long-term therapeutic relationships with 
its users. Although this study identifies several opportunities for improvement regarding 
system design, this example allows us to envisage in what ways AI might maintain patient-
centered, dynamic communication with patients in the GP clinic.  
 
 
2.2.1 An example of dynamic communication via virtual coaching 
 
 
Hudlicka (2013) conducted a study demonstrating how an ECA virtual coach can 
provide mindfulness meditation training to users via a mixed-initiative, text-based, natural 
language dialog. This study was an illustration of how the system can maintain dynamic 
communication with its user. The coach – termed ‘Chris’ – was depicted as a graphic face that 
used facial expressions to convey affect (i.e. happy, sad, or confused) in addition to text-based 
dialog. Chris personalised the content of its communication to the user’s knowledge and 
motivation levels as well as affective state. These were inferred from dynamic user models 
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constructed over time from data obtained from past interactions. Dynamic user models enabled 
the system to select responses appropriate for the specific user’s personality and characteristics 
as well as the wider context of the interaction. 
 
Chris was programmed to begin each session by guiding its user through different 
training materials. This part of the session was described as the didactic segment. Throughout 
the session, Chris would check in with the user to ensure that they were understanding the 
material (and offering further information if the user were struggling) as well as ensuring that 
motivational levels were sufficient. At regular intervals, Chris would also engage in more 
relational interaction with a view to building a stronger relationship with its user. This 
relational interaction focused on displays of affect (e.g. the interface would smile if the user 
expressed contentment with their meditation practice). 
 
The tools Chris used to support users to better understand mindfulness meditation and 
to develop sustained practice included didactic strategies (i.e. the conceptual framework of 
mindfulness) and experiential learning of different techniques such as guided meditation 
recordings. During each session, Chris would select teaching materials perceived to be of 
particular interest to the user. These selections were made based on the dynamic user models 
improved upon with each interaction. Chris was also receptive to other signals; for example, if 
a user repeatedly inquired about the benefits of meditation for stress, the system would follow 
up with questions about the user’s stress levels and subsequently customise its teaching.16 
 
When interacting with Chris, users had the choice of communicating via two different 
channels: a free-form natural language input or a multi-choice based input. When 
communicating via free-form natural language, the user could type any question or comment 
that Chris, in turn, could respond to. Once text had been submitted, Chris would scan the text 
for keywords and then respond with a phrase associated with those keywords. If Chris failed 
to identify any keywords, it would express disappointment through replies such as, “I am sorry, 
but I didn’t understand what you meant” with a corresponding facial expression. It would also 
 
16 As topics such as stress may be sensitive for some individuals, Chris was programmed to frame such 
questions cautiously in case it had made an inaccurate inference about the user. 
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ask the user if they would like to add their question to the database with a view to improving 
natural language understanding in future interactions.17 
 
The second option of communication – multi-choice based input – addressed the 
problem of keyword misunderstanding by enabling the user to select pre-set responses from a 
panel of different options. Multi-choice based input was availed heavily during the more 
didactic segments of communication (for example, when the user was asked to select a goal 
for the session) and was found to decrease users’ frustration with Chris’ high rate of 
misunderstandings during natural language communication. Interestingly, after engaging in 
multi-choice based communication, users reported that Chris’ understanding of natural 
language communication had improved despite no reduction in the rate of errors. 
 
In her study, Hudlicka found that the ECA’s virtual coaching was more effective in 
helping users establish regular mindfulness meditation practice than self-administered training 
based upon written and audio teaching materials. Chris is one example of how AI can rise to 
the challenge of maintaining dynamic communication with users. Mixed-initiative, text-based 
dialog (including both free-form natural language input and multi-choice based input) as well 
as didactic strategies and dynamic user modeling enabled Chris to personalise coaching to the 
users' individual needs, thus corresponding with the objectives of patient-centered medicine. 
As recognised by Hudlicka, future research might improve upon Chris’ keyword identification 
(and general communicative abilities) as well as addressing deficits in “… the affective and 
social realism of the coach’s embodiment and interaction, via more complex user emotion 
recognition and affective modeling” (p. 165). However, despite underperforming in these 
areas, positive results from Hudlicka’s study indicate that dynamic communication does not 
pose as significant a problem for AI as critics have claimed. 
 
Hudlicka’s study also enables us to imagine how AI could perform the five steps of 
patient-centered communication as advanced by Hashim (2017). For example, AI could elicit 
the patient’s agenda through both free-form natural language input and multi-choice based 
 
17 Failure to identify keywords – a common occurrence – is one of several limitations of free-form natural 
language input (not limited to Hudlicka’s study). A further limitation includes how these system can only draw 




input (depending on what is deemed most appropriate for what stage of the interviewing and 
what corresponds with patient preference). Through these modes of input, AI can begin to 
understand the patient’s perspective and develop a dynamic user model to keep returning to 
(and embellishing) throughout the interaction. In response to the patient’s presenting 
complaint, AI can express empathy through displays of affect (e.g. facial expressions if the AI 
is to assume a visual interface such as the ECA featured in Hudlicka’s study). From the current 
findings, there is little reason to presume that revealing a clinical diagnosis would push the 
extent of AI’s communicative abilities either. Although a similar outcome is anticipated for 
shared decision-making, additional challenges to this process will be raised in section 2.3. 
 
Hudlicka demonstrates how dynamic communication does not pose as significant an 
obstacle for AI as has been claimed. This demonstration increases the feasibility of AI 
assuming the role of the doctor in such a way that provides the benefits of patient-centeredness 
and the therapeutic alliance. The success of the latter two dimensions of the therapeutic alliance 
– the goal-oriented and action-oriented dimensions (concerning goal-setting and decision-
making, respectively) – rely heavily on dynamic communication. Without effective, dynamic 
communication, doctor and patient cannot set goals nor make decisions regarding medical 
treatment that take into account patients’ personal values and preferences. However, an ability 
to maintain dynamic communication is insufficient for AI to fulfil the requirements of patient-
centered medicine: patient values and preferences are not always accessible, and as several 
authors have pointed out, the very nature of AI may threaten principles of patient-centeredness. 
Section 2.3 will present three challenges to AI’s execution of patient-centered medicine, and 
how they may be addressed through effective, dynamic communication. 
 
 
2.3 Three challenges to communication in goal-setting and decision-making 
 
 
Whilst the ability to maintain dynamic communication is a necessary step for patient-
centered medicine, it is not sufficient: there are further challenges that AI must learn to navigate 
if it is to uphold standards of patient-centeredness. The remaining sections in this chapter will 
highlight three of these challenges relating to the goal and action-oriented dimensions of the 
therapeutic alliance. These include the problem of implicit values and preferences (where 
values and preferences are not easily accessible), the problem of unknown and unstable values 
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and preferences (where values and preferences are unidentified and/or subject to change), and 
the problems of epistemic obligation and black-box medicine (where AI’s epistemic authority 
and obscure nature create tension between evidence-based practice and patient-centered 
medicine). 
 
My intention here is to briefly raise these challenges rather than to resolve them. 
However, where possible, I will indicate how future research might approach these issues. It is 
also worth noting that these three problems pose significant challenges to human doctors as 
well as AI (see Brennan and Strombom, 1998); however, to defend the replacement thesis (at 
least with regards to goal-setting and decision-making processes), it will need to be proven that 
AI is as good as – or at least on par with – human communicative abilities. 
 
 
2.3.1 The problem of implicit values and preferences 
 
 
The first problem describes how patients may understand their own values and 
preferences but fail to explicitly communicate them (thus rendering them inaccessible to the 
doctor). This can become problematic when AI need to factor these values and preferences into 
its algorithms to produce patient-centered treatment recommendations and guidance as 
necessary during goal-setting and decision-making stages. 
 
Drawing on argumentation theory, Bigi (2014, p. 8) visualises this problem through the 
following practical reasoning: 
 
  I have a goal (G) 
 
  A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to cause G 
 
Therefore, I should (ought to) produce A 
 
 Consider an example whereby a patient has the goal to stop smoking (G = smoking 
cessation).18 According to Bigi, the patient – let’s call him Theodore – believes G to be 
 
18 The problem of implicit values and preferences assumes that the patient already has an identified goal. 
Section 2.3.2 addresses the situation where values, preferences, and goals are unknown. 
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desirable because he places value on his health and he believes that G will promote his health. 
Theodore’s belief that his health is valuable is thus what determines the acceptability of this 
goal. Deeming smoking cessation acceptable then decides what actions (A) are necessary to 
achieve it. Thus, Theodore’s practical reasoning might look like this: 
  
I have the goal of smoking cessation 
 
Nicotine replacement therapy is necessary (or sufficient) for me to stop smoking 
 
Therefore, I should (ought to) begin nicotine replacement therapy 
  
Theodore is able to identify smoking cessation as his goal because he recognises the value he 
places on his health. For AI – and, indeed, humans – an anticipated challenge is that Theodore 
may not make this particular value clear. In the clinical relationship, doctor and patient do not 
always share the rationale behind their reasoning and because of this, patient values and 
preferences are often assumed based on the limited information that the doctor has. In instances 
such as these, processes such as goal-setting and decision-making cannot be considered patient-
centered. Moreover, misunderstandings become more frequent and the likelihood of arriving 
at shared, mutually-agreed upon actions (and, consequently, positive health outcomes) 
decreases. 
 
 Bigi has suggested that doctors help explicate patients’ values and preferences through 
the use of different dialogue types (that is, models of interaction that serve different purposes 
in different contexts; see McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons, 2007). It may be that AI can be 
programmed with a Deliberation Dialogue Framework (as originally developed by McBurney 
and colleagues) that functions as an interaction protocol and resembles some of the different 
dialogue types that doctors use to elucidate patient values and preferences. Future research 
might take this framework and apply it to a medical context such as the clinical encounter to 
examine how AI might uphold principles of patient-centered medicine during goal-setting and 
decision-making processes. 
 
 The problem of implicit values and preferences makes one significant assumption: that 
patients know what their values and preferences are but that they fail to communicate them. 
Under circumstances where patients do not have this knowledge, an approach such as that 
proposed by Bigi may be limited. The following section discusses situations that may arise 
where doctors must not only explicate patients’ values and preferences, but where they must 
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2.3.2 The problem of unknown and unstable values and preferences 
 
 
Whilst research indicates the increasing proficiency of AI-driven decision support 
systems (see chapter one), certain situations have been identified where AI-DSS may struggle 
to make decisions in line with the values of patient-centered medicine (Epstein and Gramling, 
2013). These situations are often characterised by a lack of clinical evidence and/or clearly 
defined treatment options.19 In situations like these, patient values and preferences tend to be 
“… contextual, provisional, and conditional” (p. 95S), their stability undermined by unfamiliar 
and unanticipated circumstances that are often emotionally-charged. Moreover, patients may 
not have experience in thinking about abstract concepts such as values and preferences, and 
attempting to do so under the often demanding conditions of the clinical encounter may be 
overwhelming (Brennan and Strombom, 1996). Without sufficient clinical evidence or clear 
treatment options, values, preferences, and goals cannot be identified and decisions cannot be 
made. Attainment of the goal and action-oriented dimensions of the therapeutic alliance thus 
becomes difficult.20 Clinical uncertainties reflect the reality of medicine and present a 
substantial challenge for AI aiming to uphold tenets of patient-centered medicine in goal-
setting and decision-making processes. 
 
Epstein and Gramling (2013) describe how doctors helping patients to identify and 
articulate changing values and preferences involves more than just offering available 
information and asking their opinion. It also involves communicating about communication: 
“… what patients want to know, what information is relevant, how patients prefer to be 
informed, patients’ roles in decision making, and who else (if anyone) should be present” (p. 
 
19 It may also be the case that, for some patients, we just do not have data (for example, they may present with 
unusual and/or unexplainable symptoms or they may be new to a particular healthcare system). 
20 Goals in particular may also be unidentifiable for the reason that goals often become apparent only after 
preliminary action has been taken (for example, the first stage of a particular treatment option allowing doctor 
and patient to review the situation before proceeding; Epstein and Gramling, 2013). 
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100S). Preference construction in this context is thus “… relational, dynamic, iterative, 
provisional, and conditional – it involves building relationships, providing information, and 
exploring preferences, which then strengthen relationships, understanding, and involvement in 
decisions” (p. 100S). 
 
To illustrate how a situation such as this might look (and how a doctor might navigate 
it), let us return to the example of Theodore – only assuming that he does not have or is aware 
of having the same values and preferences as in the previous scenario. Perhaps he has been 
seeing his GP for chest pain, and following several tests and scans, learns that he has coronary 
heart disease. Theodore is a heavy smoker and so, in the interests of symptom management, 
his GP recommends that he reduce or cease smoking. Theodore agrees to try to cease smoking 
because he finds the chest pain unpleasant and would like to avoid exacerbation of further 
symptoms. The goal-oriented dimension of the therapeutic alliance has thus been fulfilled with 
collaborative selection of the goal of smoking cessation. However, the action-oriented 
dimension – or, in other words, how to go about achieving this goal – is decidedly more 
complex. 
 
Theodore’s GP might advocate nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) as the gold 
standard of smoking cessation interventions. However, in order for this recommendation to be 
patient-centered, doctor and patient must – as Epstein and Gramling put it – communicate about 
communicating. What might Theodore want to know about NRT that might influence his 
agreement? Theodore might express concern over potential side effects, thus conveying to his 
doctor that the physical experience of smoking cessation is important to him. Having 
understood that this information is relevant, his GP can describe the different possible side 
effects of NRT. For Theodore, learning that insomnia, headaches, dizziness, and stomach pain 
are common side effects might deter him from pursuing this route. His GP might explore this 
preference further to try to ascertain to what extent this preference is valid: would Theodore 
consider NRT if he could also be prescribed therapies to counter these side effects (for example, 
sleeping aids to counter the insomnia)? If not, what does Theodore value more: managing the 
symptoms (and accumulative consequences) of coronary heart disease, or avoiding the possible 
side effects of NRT? It may be the case that Theodore finds the possible side effects of NRT 
to be more unpleasant than the symptoms of coronary heart disease despite understanding his 
increased risk of experiencing a heart attack. Ultimately, Theodore’s autonomy in the decision-
making process should be given precedence, and in order to maintain a patient-centered 
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approach, his GP should respect and support his choice.21 In place of NRT, they might suggest 
the alternative of e-cigarettes.22 Despite the downside that e-cigarettes are not on prescription 
and thus would come at Theodore’s own cost, it becomes clear that Theodore would rather 
spend more money if the upshot is avoiding the side effects of NRT.  
 
This is but one illustration of how clinical situations might incorporate unknown and 
unstable values and preferences. Although there is not a lack of clinical evidence regarding 
smoking cessation, there is a lack of clearly defined treatment options within the parameters of 
Theodore’s unidentified (though present) values and preferences – values and preferences 
which are contextual, provisional, and conditional upon the potential outcomes of these 
options. In this instance, Theodore's preference to manage the painful symptoms of coronary 
heart disease is outweighed by his preference to avoid the side effects of NRT. This impacts 
the interventions available to him, leading him to try replacing normal cigarettes with e-
cigarettes. Although the use of e-cigarettes has been shown to be less effective than NRT, 
patient-centered medicine dictates that his GP respects the value Theodore places on side effect 
management over the value he places on his general health. These values and preferences may 
be contextual in that Theodore may live a lifestyle allowing him the luxury of prioritising the 
quality of his health over the longevity of it, and provisional in that he may be more willing to 
tolerate the side effects of a more effective intervention if the symptoms of coronary heart 
disease worsen. These factors and variables should be explored in conversation between 
Theodore and his GP before committing to an intervention. Providing all of these terms are 
met, we can then characterise the action-oriented dimension of the therapeutic alliance – 
whereby, in this example, Theodore and his GP have decided to approach the goal of smoking 
cessation through the use of e-cigarettes – as patient-centered. This is because it takes into 
account Theodore’s values and preferences (i.e. managing the symptoms of coronary heart 
disease and avoiding the side effects of NRT, respectively). 
 
 
21 That is not to say that respect for patient autonomy is an overriding value. Respect for patient autonomy 
should be managed on a case-by-case basis and if AI is to replace human doctors, it must be able to sufficiently 
navigate these situations. 
22 Another alternative would be a prescriptions such as varenicline or bupropion. These are more evidence-based 
interventions for smoking cessation than e-cigarettes, however entail the same side effects as NRT. Under a 
patient-centered framework, Theodore’s GP should seek his opinion instead of making an assumption based on 
how Theodore has responded to the option of NRT. 
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How might AI navigate the challenge of unknown and unstable values and preferences? 
This is a problem that AI will need to respond to in order to maintain a patient-centered 
approach in situations of this kind. As with the problem of implicit values and preferences, I 
suspect that the answer to this question is largely grounded in AI’s ability to communicate 
dynamically with patients. By adopting an approach similar to Theodore’s doctor, it is 
conceivable to imagine Hudlicka’s (2013) ECA ‘Chris’ engaging in the above dialogue with a 
patient. Chris could begin by asking if Theodore already has an idea of what he would like to 
do regarding his diagnosis of coronary heart disease. If Theodore doesn’t have an answer, Chris 
could volunteer a treatment option (such as NRT) that is both evidence-based and corresponds 
with the patient data the system has on Theodore. Theodore’s response to the suggestion of 
NRT provides more information regarding his values and preferences: for example, if he rejects 
this idea because he doesn’t like the sound of the side effects, Chris learns that Theodore places 
value on the physical experience of giving up smoking. After clarifying that this is indeed the 
case, Chris can explore remaining treatment options with Theodore until a more suitable 
intervention – i.e. e-cigarettes – emerges. Once Theodore has agreed to try using e-cigarettes 
in place of normal cigarettes, Chris can explore to what extent this preference is valid. This 
exploration goes some way in addressing the issue of values and preferences being contextual, 
provisional, and conditional, and further establishes the parameters of Theodore’s treatment. 
Through this process of dynamic communication, Chris can support Theodore to develop a 
treatment plan to stop smoking in such a way that respects both Theodore’s autonomy in the 
decision-making process and principles of patient-centered medicine. 
 
A similar system to that described above was developed and tested in a study by Barry 
et al. (1995). Although the study did not involve AI nor dynamic communication, it is 
nonetheless helpful for envisaging how software might meet the needs of value and preference 
explication in complex situations. Investigating the facilitation of patient participation in 
treatment decisions via a computer program, Barry and colleagues designed an interactive 
media program (Shared Decisionmaking Program; SDP) to communicate information 
regarding different treatment options for patients with benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH). 
These researchers recognised the difficulty in facilitating patient participation in treatment 
decision making in such a way that is consistent with their values and preferences; especially 
under circumstances involving unknown outcomes that may influence them. In the study, 
patients were introduced to the subject of BPH by their urologists (and given an introductory 
brochure) and then were invited to engage with the SDP. The SDP outlined the two treatment 
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options available as well as the treatments’ respective risks and benefits. This information was 
presented via a combination of motion video, audio, and real-time computer graphics. The 
interactive nature of the program allowed for probabilities personalised to patients’ own 
characteristics, which were obtained through a self-completed questionnaire requesting 
information on patients’ demographics, symptoms, and health status (amongst other items). 
Patients were also given ‘vicarious experiences’ (that is, virtual presentations from previous 
BPH patients discussing possible treatment outcomes) to assist in their decision making. After 
being provided with a printed summary of the information covered by the SDP, the final 
decision regarding which treatment option to explore was left to patient and urologist. 
 
Barry and colleagues conducted a pilot study to investigate patients’ reactions to the 
SDP and found that 77% of participants were “… very positive… about the program’s 
usefulness in making a treatment decision” (p. 771) and “… were willing to return for an extra 
visit to see the SDP” (p. 779). Although developments in computer software have improved 
since its year of publication, the present study is a cursory demonstration of how a system 
might meet the challenges inherent in the problem of unknown and unstable values and 
preferences; particularly with regards to unknown outcomes to different treatment options. 
 
Unlike the problem of unknown and unstable values and preferences, the final 
challenge to patient-centered goal-setting and decision-making is similar to the first challenge 
in that it assumes the patient understands their own values and preferences. The problem lies, 
however, in that AI algorithms appeal to evidence-based medicine over patient-centered 
medicine, producing a tension between the two normative frameworks. Moreover, these 
algorithms are obscure, meaning that it is not always clear as to why a certain treatment option 
has been recommended. The next section explores these issues in greater depth.   
 
 
2.3.3 The problems of epistemic obligation and black-box medicine 
 
 
In addition to the problems of implicit values and preferences and unknown and 
unstable values and preferences, the matters of epistemic obligation and black-box medicine 
present a challenge for AI when engaging in goal-setting and decision-making processes with 
patients. Here, epistemic obligation refers to an obligation to adhere to someone or something 
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on account of their epistemic authority whilst black-box medicine describes medical practices 
driven by nontransparent algorithms. Black-box medicine will be further discussed later in this 
section. 
 
As Bjerring and Busch (2020) and Hatherley (2020) raise, the implementation of AI 
may result in an epistemic obligation for doctors to rely upon them during decision-making 
processes.23 Bjerring and Busch offer the following parallel with human health professionals 
when facing uncertainty: “… if a practitioner knows of an epistemic source that is more 
knowledgeable, more accurate, and more reliable in decision-making, she should treat it as an 
expert and align her verdicts with those of the source” (p. 3). Given AI’s proficiency in clinical 
decision-making (as covered in chapter one), doctors may thus find themselves under an 
epistemic obligation to adopt whatever judgement the system puts forward.24 However, the 
conclusions generated by AI may conflict with the values and preferences of patients that are 
essential to patient-centered medicine. The following paragraphs will detail how this may be 
the case. 
 
McDougall (2020) agrees with Bjerring and Busch that the application of AI is in 
tension with “… the ethical ideal of shared decision making in healthcare” (p. 156). She uses 
IBM’s Watson for Oncology to demonstrate how AI can fail to take into account for patient 
values and preferences when ranking treatment options.25 Watson for Oncology is a computer 
system that uses AI to generate treatment recommendations by comparing patient data against 
several hundred medical journals and textbooks. These treatment recommendations are ranked 
 
23 Bjerring and Busch (2020) and Hatherley (2020) assume that AI will take on a supplementary role in the 
clinic whereby a human doctor is still the primary point of contact for patients and AI is employed to support 
doctors’ diagnostic and decision-making capabilities. This assumption does not implicate my inquiry, where I 
am exploring the plausibility of AI replacing doctors entirely. The same tensions between epistemic superiority 
and patient-centered medicine are still in force with the only difference being that AI must resolve this tension 
rather than a human doctor. 
24 Humphreys (2009) has coined the term anthropocentric predicament to describe this problem. As he explains, 
new technologies have generated a situation where “… an exclusively anthropocentric epistemology is no 
longer appropriate because there now exist superior, non-human, epistemic authorities. So we are now faced 
with a problem… of how we, as humans, can understand and evaluate computationally based scientific methods 
that transcend our own abilities” (p. 617). 
25 Although Watson for Oncology assumes a supplementary role when advancing treatment recommendations, 
we can translate this example to a replacement context and raise the same questions. 
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according to outcome statistics represented by ‘disease-free survival’. Watson for Oncology 
thus ranks treatment options aligned with the goal of maximising lifespan as opposed to the 
personal goal(s) of the individual patient. McDougall argues that assumption of this particular 
goal is problematic because the patient may not consider longevity to be their priority. Rather, 
they may be more interested in the quality of the years they have left; a value that the system’s 
recommended treatment choices does not recognise. Moreover, Watson for Oncology is not 
programmed to communicate to doctors and patients that decision-making can be a value-laden 
process. The concern is that AI will be perceived as generating the ‘right’ answer as opposed 
to “… suggesting a treatment based on a particular set of generic parameters that may not in 
fact best reflect the goals, values and preferences of [the] specific patient” (Goodman, 2007, p. 
132, as cited by McDougall, p. 158).26 
 
Price II (2017) uses the term ‘black-box medicine’ to describe medical practices 
whereby black-box algorithms – such as IBM’s Watson for Oncology – are at the helm of 
decision-making.27 Black-box medicine muddies patient-centered medicine’s aim of “… 
shared information, shared deliberation, and shared mind” (Epstein, 2010, p. 1491). 
Recognising patients as individual, autonomous people with their own values and preferences 
is a challenge for black-box systems, and because they operate on data, the concern is that the 
complexity of each individual patient cannot be translated into a “… bundle of useful data 
points that we can feed to an algorithm” (Bjerring and Busch, p. 12).28 
 
26 One might counter that patients still have the opportunity to articulate their values and preferences before 
committing to a treatment plan, however McDougall argues that without these guiding the ranking process, 
patient autonomy cannot be fully respected. Values and preferences should be held as the “… primary 
parameter, not a secondary consideration” (p. 159).  
27 AI sift through enormous amounts of health data (the ‘input’) to search for patterns to guide clinical 
diagnostics and decision-making (the ‘output’). These systems are opaque (‘black’) in that humans have no 
access to the algorithmic mechanisms that generate these outputs. This opacity leads to AI being described as a 
‘black box’ with its decisions being characteristically “unknown and unknowable” (Price II, 2018, p. 295). For a 
more comprehensive overview of black-box systems, see Bjerring and Busch (2020), Braun et al. (2020) and 
London (2019). 
28 The argument that black box medicine is in tension with patient-centered medicine has another implication. 
Evidence-based medicine – that is, medicine informed by the results of randomised, controlled clinical trials and 
other meta-analyses of medical data – is held to be the ‘gold standard’ of medicine (Bjerring and Busch, 2020). 





Bjerring and Busch (2020) further argue that black-box medicine conflicts with ideals 
of patient-centered medicine – in particular, shared decision-making (the action-oriented 
dimension of the therapeutic alliance) – because if doctors cannot understand why AI have put 
forward certain recommendations, they cannot explain that to the patients.29 Explainability is 
held to be a condition of patient-centeredness as patients cannot make informed decisions 
without the ability to “make sense of the [medical] information presented and… process it 
rationally to reach a decision that furthers their health care goals” (Bernat and Peterson, 2006, 
p. 88). Black-box medicine therefore challenges traditional decision-making processes where 
doctors and patients can “… articulate their rationale when queried, limited only by their desire 
and capacity to give an explanation, and the questioner’s capacity to understand it” (Mittelstadt 
et al., 2016, p. 7). 
 
The interrelated problems of epistemic obligation and black-box medicine place the 
very nature of AI at odds with patient-centered medicine. The first problem – epistemic 
obligation – appears more negotiable than the second. This is for the reason that patient-
centeredness in decision-making is a programmable goal much like symptom management or 
longevity of life. The challenge will be establishing a reasonable middle ground between 
patient-centered medicine and evidence-based practice as well as communicating this to 
patients. The problem of black-box medicine is comparably more difficult. It appears that we 
must either sacrifice the ethical standards of transparency and explainability that are central to 
 
of evidence-based medicine” (p. 20). However, to make such an argument – whilst also maintaining that black-
box medicine is in tension with patient-centered medicine – is to also argue that patient-centered medicine is in 
tension with evidence-based medicine. As Bjerring and Busch frame it, “depending on how much weight we put 
on the idea of shared clinical decision-making, it is clear that the central conflict between black box medicine 
and patient-centered medicine can translate into a conflict between black box medicine and evidence-based 
medicine” (p. 20). 
29 To reiterate, Bjerring and Busch assume a supplementary context whereby AI supports (rather than replaces) 
the doctor. We can imagine how this situation poses the same – or, arguably, a greater – problem without human 
mediation. In lieu of the presence of a doctor during the consultation, the responsibility falls upon AI to address 
this lack of explainability and transparency. 
35 
 
patient-centered medicine or forgo the use of AI entirely and sacrifice the epistemic superiority 
that has prompted the replacement thesis in the first place.30 
 
However, sacrificing these ethical standards of transparency and explainability may not 
be as objectionable as we are perhaps led to believe. Whilst black-box medicine’s opacity is 
often positioned in contrast to the assumed transparent and explainable nature of traditional 
medicine, to an extent, current medical practice is opaque as well. As London (2019) explains, 
“… [medicine’s] knowledge of underlying causal systems is in its infancy; the pathophysiology 
of disease is often uncertain, and the mechanisms through which interventions work is either 
not known or not well understood”. He concludes that machine learning – at least with regards 
to opacity – is not all that different from traditional medicine. Bjerring and Busch (p. 16) use 
the example of blood testing to further illustrate this point: 
 
Consider a case in which a practitioner uses a new method of blood testing to diagnose a patient 
with a particular disease. While the practitioner knows that the new method is more reliable 
than older ones, he does not really understand how the blood testing works nor why it is more 
reliable. Yet, clearly, the practitioner is under an epistemic obligation to rely on the blood 
testing in his medical decision-making. 
 
Another example is antidepressants: whilst there is an abundance of evidence citing 
their efficacy, the pharmacological mechanism behind this – as well as the extent to which they 
benefit users – remains a mystery (Wilson, 2018; Spence, 2016). Nonetheless, doctors continue 
to prescribe them at an ever-increasing rate for if a drug outperforms alternative methods, 
doctors are under an obligation to prescribe it. I raise this point not to dismiss the lack of 
explainability of black-box medicine but to highlight how traditional medicine is already 
operating under an epistemic system that prevents us from fully understanding all causal 
mechanisms involved. As was stated at the beginning of this section, to defend the replacement 
thesis, it will need to be proven that AI is at least on par with human standards and capabilities. 
Medicine’s current standards of transparency and explainability may lessen the extent to which 
black-box medicine presents an insurmountable ethical problem. 
 
 
30 We might someday understand (or ‘open’) black boxes, but on account of their increasing complexity and 




Finally, it is not clear to what extent patients want absolute explainability and 
transparency. Patient-centered medicine prescribes a level and depth of explanation that may 
exceed what patients feel they require to have their needs met. A patient being recommended 
a course of antidepressants may not be interested in understanding the pharmacological 
mechanisms underlying this treatment nor why it has been recommended over other 
interventions. It may be sufficient for the patient to know that a source of epistemic authority 
and superiority – that is, AI – has selected it on the basis of both empirical evidence and patient 
data. If the patient is satisfied with this level of explanation, patient-centered medicine may 
dictate that black-box medicine’s lack of explainability and transparency is less impermissible 






Good communication between doctor and patient is often cited as an essential aspect of 
patient-centered medicine. If AI is to replace human doctors, it will therefore need to be able 
to maintain at least the same standard of communication. Whilst the implementation of AI may 
address deficits in human communicative abilities, it is uncertain whether AI can meet the 
demands of dynamic communication necessitated by the doctor-patient encounter. 
 
In this chapter, I have presented research by Hudlicka (2013) demonstrating how an 
embodied conversational agent can be programmed to dynamically communicate with users in 
such a way that – hypothetically applied to the doctor-patient relationship – may satisfy 
principles of patient-centered medicine. I have also highlighted three challenges for 
communication in goal-setting and decision-making – integral parts of the therapeutic alliance 
– that AI will need to negotiate if it is to replace human doctors. These challenges pertain to 
implicit values and preferences, unknown and unstable values and preferences, and epistemic 
obligation and black-box medicine (whereby AI’s opaque algorithms conflict with principles 
of patient-centered medicine – namely value alignment and explainability). My intention in 
discussing these three problems has been to raise – rather than resolve – primary concerns, 
however I anticipate that they may be addressed through AI’s ability to represent patient-
centered paradigms in software design as well as explicate patients’ values and preferences via 
dynamic communication. The final problem – that posited by black-box medicine – presents 
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arguably the greatest communicative challenge to the replacement thesis. This is because it 
requires us to position ourselves with either patient-centered medicine and its emphasis on 
explainability or epistemically-superior yet unexplainable systems. One way to resolve this 
might be to concede that current medical practice does not embody normative standards of 
explainability either and that to demand full explainability of AI is thus unreasonable. If AI 
can produce greater positive health outcomes than human doctors, the opaque nature of black-
box medicine might be a reasonable trade-off. Moreover, patients may not desire absolute 
explainability nor transparency. This is a matter for further research to explore. 
 
The following chapter will examine AI’s capacity to embody a second aspect of patient-




































It is often claimed that trust is a necessary requirement for a good doctor-patient 
relationship. It is also claimed that trust cannot be upheld by AI. The concern is that if AI 
replaces humans in the role of the doctor, the absence of trust will undermine the therapeutic 
benefits of this relationship as well as undermine the quality of healthcare. In this chapter, I 
argue that what is important about trust in the doctor-patient relationship is the ability to rely 
sufficiently on the doctor to treat health problems, and that objections to AI based upon trust 
invoke notions that extend beyond this. 
 
The claim that trust is essential to the doctor-patient relationship has been made by a 
number of authors. In section 1, I present different working accounts of trust and indicate how, 
although it can have both instrumental and intrinsic value in the doctor-patient relationship, it 
is only its instrumental value that is important to the end of good health. I also emphasise the 
distinction between trust as encapsulated interest and trust as reliability and explain how – to 
the end of good health – ‘trust’ can be reduced to the more straightforward concept of 
reliability. Through sections 2-3 I describe opportunities for AI to increase the reliability of 
positive health outcomes in areas where trust is already undermined in the doctor-patient 
relationship and anticipate challenges to its implementation. Ultimately, I conclude that 
although trust itself is not a necessary requirement for the realisation of good health outcomes 
associated with the doctor-patient relationship, the foremost barrier to replacing human doctors 
with AI vis-à-vis trust is likely to be patients disengaging in response to AI’s absence of moral 






3.1 An overview of trust in the doctor-patient relationship 
 
 
In the literature several authors have outlined different understandings of the 
relationship between trust and the doctor-patient relationship. Most – if not all – accounts 
operate under the premise that some form of trust is necessary for the doctor-patient 
relationship and wider healthcare. Susskind and Susskind (2016) argue that as the role of the 
doctor undergoes automation, trust will become less important and reliability alone will suffice 
for the purposes trust had previously served (purposes which will be covered later in this 
section). Susskind and Susskind term this ‘quasi-trust’. In contrast, Hatherley (2020) argues 
that reliability does not amount to trust in any sufficient way, and that because AI can only ever 
be reliable, it is unable to meet the conditions of trust required for a good doctor-patient 
relationship. Hall et al. (2001) take the middle ground, claiming that trust has both intrinsic and 
instrumental significance (intrinsic in that it is the “… core, defining characteristic that gives 
the doctor-patient relationship meaning, importance, and substance” (p. 613) and instrumental 
in its associated therapeutic outcomes). 
 
A limitation of the discourse around trust is that different authors appeal to different 
conceptions in their arguments. In examining the value of trust to the end of good healthcare, 
it is helpful to establish a definitional foundation that minimises ambiguity around the term 
itself. To do so, let us review the many ways in which trust is understood in the literature. 
 
As a concept, trust comprises several different elements; for example, Susskind and 
Susskind (2016) and Barber (1983) highlight reliability as a key component of trust in that one 
may trust in someone or something if they/it can be relied upon to produce an expected 
outcome. A similar understanding is offered by Fugelli (2001, p. 575) who stipulates that this 
reliability is staked in an individual’s “… sincerity, benevolence, and truthfulness”. This 
sentiment is echoed by Hardin (2002) when he emphasises the importance of the motivation 
and interests of the individual being trusted. In addition to Hardin, McLeod (2020) highlights 
the relationship between trust and risk, arguing that to trust is to depend upon someone or 
something that is not guaranteed (for if the outcome were guaranteed, there would exist no 
need to trust in the first place). Researchers such as Hall et al. (2001) and Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman (1995) further this component by describing how to trust is to demonstrate a 
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another (a vulnerability enabled by risk). In this 
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chapter, I will argue that whether AI replacement undermines trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship depends upon how we define trust. 
 
Nundy, Montgomery and Wachter (2019) describe how trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship is constituted by three different components: competency, motive, and 
transparency. By competency, Nundy and colleagues refer to the extent to which doctors 
effectively perform their role. The component of motive reflects patients’ perception that their 
doctor is acting in their best interests, and transparency entails doctors’ ability and obligation 
to explain and account for their decisions. These three components all overlap to some degree, 
informing, strengthening, and sometimes undermining one another. 
 
Trust is considered by some to be a fundamental value within the doctor-patient 
relationship and is said to hold both intrinsic and instrumental value. Intrinsically, trust is held 
to be the “… defining characteristic that gives the doctor-patient relationship meaning, 
importance, and significance” (Fritz and Holton, 2019, p. 613; see also Hatherley, 2020). 
However, trust can also be disadvantageous: trusting an incompetent doctor may be more 
harmful than not trusting a competent doctor. Is trusting therefore something we should 
reasonably attach intrinsic importance to? It may instead be helpful to consider how it may be 
instrumentally valuable. 
 
There are several ways that trust may have instrumental value in the doctor-patient 
relationship. Mechanic (1996) has argued that trust is valuable because it enables doctor and 
patient to jointly establish objectives of care and to ascertain how they might achieve them. 
Further research shows that patients are more likely to accept and abide by treatment plans if 
they have a trusting relationship with their doctor, and moreover, a trusting relationship can 
contribute to positive health outcomes and placebo effects (Hatherley, 2020; Hall et al., 2001). 
Hall et al. describe how patients are more willing to seek care, disclose sensitive information, 
participate in medical research, continue to see the same doctor over a long period of time, and 
recommend their doctor to others if their clinical relationship involves a high degree of trust. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that when trust erodes in wider medical institutions, 
the trust a patient has in their individual doctor can insulate them from conflict (Mechanic, 
1996; see also Andreassen et al., 2006). Finally, trust can help patients to navigate perceived 
risk (Andreassen et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998); a necessity in a landscape such as 




In this context, trust appears to be used as an interpersonal tool to secure positive 
outcomes. It seems that the confidence a patient has in their doctor’s capabilities is what 
enables this trust to thrive, thus indicating that the instrumental value of trust – at least with 
respect to the doctor-patient relationship – may be reducible to reliability (in that trust is a 
function of how reliable a doctor is in achieving positive health outcomes). In the following 
section, I will differentiate between trust as a morally-laden concept and trust as reliability with 




3.2 Trust as encapsulated interest versus trust as reliability 
 
 
I have presented some of the ways in which trust may have both intrinsic and 
instrumental value in the doctor-patient relationship. If we are to hold that the objective of the 
doctor-patient relationship is to achieve good health, then arguably this instrumental value is 
of greater importance. In the previous section, I proposed that the instrumental value of trust 
in this context may be reducible to reliability (in that the correlation between trust in one’s 
doctor and positive health outcomes may be arbitrated by doctors’ perceived competency). This 
raises the question of whether we can interchange ‘trust’ with ‘reliability’. To better place us 
to answer this question, this section further explores the difference between trust as a morally-
laden concept and trust as reliability. 
 
Although reliability clearly plays some role in trust, Hardin (2002) suspects that there 
is more to it. To illustrate, consider the following two hypothetical scenarios: 
 
1. Chloë has driven into town to run some errands. She forgot to bring coins to pay for a parking space 
so she parks her car in a ten minute zone. She knows that her errands will take longer than ten 
minutes to run, but she has seen the parking officer drive past recently and is trusting that they will 
not return for some time so that she does not receive a parking ticket. 
2. Hamish suffers from insomnia. He has been experiencing increased anxiety at work which has, in 
turn, exacerbated his inability to sleep. He books an appointment with his GP, Dr. Green, to explore 
how he might address this. When Hamish has been unable to sleep in the past, Dr. Green has 
prescribed zolpidem as an effective short-term measure. She has also raised the option of a referral 
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to a cognitive-behavioural therapist as a more long-term option. Given these positive past 
experiences, Hamish trusts that Dr. Green will be able to support him to manage his sleep. 
 
In the above scenarios, there is something inaccurate with claiming that Chloë trusts 
the parking officer not to drive past in the same way that Hamish trusts Dr. Green to relieve his 
insomnia. Although Chloë and Hamish both rely on the parking officer and Dr. Green to act in 
a certain way, their reliance does not amount to the same kind of trust. We might attribute this 
to the fact that there may be more to trust than mere reliability. Hardin (2002) maintains that 
trusting in someone entails the belief that both of your interests align. He describes this as 
encapsulated interest: “your trust is your expectation that my interests encapsulate yours” (p. 
5). As a doctor striving to help her patients, Dr. Green shares Hamish’s interest of relieving his 
insomnia. By comparison, we would not expect the parking officer to share Chloë’s interest of 
overstaying on the ten minute parking space. 
 
It is worth clarifying exactly what is meant by Hardin’s claim that to trust requires the 
alignment of interests. To have an interest in something requires a motivation (and, vice versa, 
to have a motivation requires an interest). In the context of trust, it might be that this motivation 
must specifically be well-intentioned.31 On this basis, it makes sense for Hamish to trust Dr. 
Green because he knows that her motivation to help him is part of her motivation as a doctor.32 
In contrast, it seems odd to describe Chloë as trusting in the parking officer when we might 
reasonably assume that his interests lie in motorists abiding by the rules. This conflicts with 
Chloë’s interest of overstaying; therefore we cannot describe both the Chloë and the parking 
officer’s interests as aligned and in good will. 
 
Hardin also argues that the alignment of interests alone is insufficient to understand 
trust as encapsulated interest. To meet the conditions for encapsulated interest, the two 
individuals must also value the continuation of their relationship: “our ongoing relationship… 
may generate mutually reinforcing expectations that each of us sees as obligating to some 
extent and that each of us may have reason to think the other sees as obligating” (p. 78).  Only 
 
31 The relationship between the nature of one’s motivation and trust has also been explored by Baier (1986) and 
Jones (1996); both underscore the connection between ‘good will’ and trust. 
32 It is worth noting that although Hamish may trust Dr. Green to have his best interests at heart, he may not 
trust her regarding other matters (for example, to tell him the truth). This further highlights the multidimensional 
nature of trust and how it can be problematic to define the concept by one characteristic alone. 
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the second example above meets this condition: we would expect that Dr. Green seeks to 
continue her doctor-patient relationship with Hamish whereas there exists no meaningful 
relationship between Chloë and the parking officer outside of this potential interaction. This 
condition highlights a way in which – at least under Hardin’s framework – machines might 
struggle to embody trust as encapsulated interest as they have no personal interest in continuing 
a relationship with their patients. 
 
In further understanding the distinction between reliability and trust, we might look to 
Fritz and Holton’s (2019) splitting of trust into behavioural and attitudinal dimensions. The 
behavioural dimension involves relying on someone to follow through with something, 
whereas the attitudinal dimension involves the belief that that person will do so with your best 
interests at heart. If we translate this to the above scenarios, we might describe Chloë as 
appealing to the behavioural dimension when she trusts the parking officer not to drive past in 
the near future, whereas we might describe Hamish as predominantly appealing to the 
attitudinal dimension when he trusts Dr. Green to help him manage his sleep. Understanding 
trust through these two dimensions is another way to demonstrate how it may be possible to 
rely without trusting but not to trust without relying. Applied to the present context, we might 
argue that we can rely upon machines (via the behavioural dimension of trust) but not trust 
them (via the attitudinal dimension). 
 
Another way to think about the difference between reliability and trust is through 
normative and descriptive expectations. Nickel and Vaesen (2012 as cited by Hatherley, 2020, 
p. 6) illustrate this by describing how “I rely on you when I predict that you will behave in a 
certain way, though I trust you when I judge that you ought to behave in a certain way”. If we 
apply this to the scenarios above, we might describe Chloë as relying upon the parking officer 
not to drive past in the near future (as she has seen them drive past a short while ago) whereas 
we might describe Hamish as trusting Dr. Green to relieve his insomnia because she is 
obligated to use her medical expertise. 
 
In this section, I have explicated the difference between trust and reliability by 
comparing two hypothetical scenarios under Hardin’s framework of encapsulated interest. 
Doing so enables me to demonstrate why AI cannot embody trust as encapsulated interest but 
how it may be relied upon to reach a specific outcome. Assuming that reliability is all that is 
needed for the purposes of achieving good health (as I have proposed in section 3.1), it is 
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plausible that AI could replace the role of the doctor without undermining the instrumentality 
of trust to good healthcare. 
 
By taking trust to represent reliability, when I henceforth agree that trust is a valuable 
tool within the doctor-patient relationship, I agree that it is valuable as reliability. Moreover, 
from this point onwards, I will refer to Hardin’s notion of encapsulated interest as ‘trust’ and 
reliability as ‘reliability’. I will thus argue that only reliability is a necessary condition for 
producing positive health outcomes associated with the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
I have identified good health as the primary goal by which I assess the value of trust to 
the doctor-patient relationship and the corresponding feasibility of the replacement thesis. In 
the following section, I outline three threats to trust in the present doctor-patient relationship 
and suggest how the implementation of AI might strengthen the reliability of good health 
outcomes across these situations. 
 
 
3.3 Opportunities for AI to increase reliability 
 
 
Several threats to trust in the present doctor-patient relationship have been identified. 
Three of these include the undermining of doctors’ competency vis-à-vis competing sources of 
health information such as the internet, conflicts of interest arising from commercialised 
medicine, and reduced clinical interaction times resulting from pushes towards resource 
efficiency. In this section, I aim to highlight how AI might increase the reliability of positive 
health outcomes across these settings in ways that humans cannot, and describe how this 
increased reliability relieves the need for patients to trust in their doctor in the first place. 
 
 
3.3.1 Undermining of doctors’ competency 
 
 
Mechanic (1996) has argued that the increased availability of medical information 
threatens trust in the doctor-patient relationship. Whereas this information was once accessible 
only to health professionals, the public can now seek guidance from external sources such as 
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the internet (Sriram, 2019; Erdem and Harrison-Walker, 2006; Murray et al., 2003; Williams 
et al., 2002). One study indicates that a majority of people (64.2%) obtain health information 
from the internet (Sriram, 2019) whilst Van Riel et al. (2017) describe how patients also search 
the internet before consulting their doctor to prepare for the GP consultation and facilitate 
communication with their GP. An outcome of this is that patients come to question doctors’ 
expertise and authority when their diagnosis or advice doesn’t match information found online. 
This, consequently, can undermine the trust a patient has in their doctors’ competence (see also 
Sriram, 2019; Murray et al., 2003).33 As noted earlier, Nundy, Montgomery and Wachter 
(2019) identify competence as integral to trust. 
 
AI might address this problem through its cognitive capacity. As AI has immediate 
access to a larger collection of medical literature and research than human doctors, it is the 
greatest epistemic source available. There is therefore little reason to doubt its competency (at 
least with regards to information-based capabilities). In turn, this is likely to shift the authority 
of competing sources such as the internet. Whilst AI is unlikely to stop patients conducting 
their own research outside of the clinical consultation, the probability of patients believing 
unregulated, misleading online information over that of their doctor is minimised.  
 
Although a more detailed account of current AI capabilities can be found in chapter 
one, the following paragraphs will summarise a handful of findings to further demonstrate AI’s 
epistemic superiority. For example, Topol (2019) and Hart (2017) have described how 
researchers have successfully developed AI that is starting to outperform human clinicians in 
medical diagnostics. This is perhaps unsurprising as it is estimated that doctors commit 
diagnostic errors 10-15% of the time (Elstein, 1995) with some sources approximating that the 
actual number is closer to 30% (see Fan et al., 2018). Furthermore, up to twelve million adults 
in the United States are wrongly diagnosed each year (of which half of these misdiagnoses 
prove harmful; Singh, Meyer and Thomas, 2014). 
 
As covered in chapter one, a recent systematic review and meta-analysis on medical 
imaging demonstrated that when comparing human doctors with deep learning systems, 
humans correctly diagnosed diseases 86% of the time and gave a correct all-clear 91% of the 
 
33 This undermining of trust occurs despite online medical information often being unregulated, inaccurate, and 
misleading (Sriram, 2019; Erdem and Harrison-Walker, 2006). 
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time whereas deep learning systems correctly diagnosed 87% of the time and gave a correct 
all-clear 93% of the time (Liu et al., 2019). We might feel more sympathetic towards humans’ 
rate of misdiagnoses when we consider how, on account of the medical literature doubling 
every three years, doctors would need to read for roughly twenty nine hours each workday to 
stay on top of new developments (Curioni-Fontecedro, 2017). With their ability to assimilate 
and retain large quantities of information, such a task would not prove problematic for AI. 
 
I cite these findings to reiterate how AI’s epistemic superiority might replace the need 
for trust in doctors’ competency. This may then undermine the epistemic authority of external, 
unregulated and potentially misleading sources such as the internet. Although patients may not 
come to trust in AI in the same way that they can doctors, AI’s epistemic superiority means 
that it is more reliable at achieving positive health outcomes than human doctors, thus 
rendering the need for trust in (an AI) doctors’ competency irrelevant. Although some patients 
may be sceptical that AI is more reliable than human doctors, such scepticism is countered by 
the expanding body of research – as outlined in chapter one – indicating otherwise. 
 
 
3.3.2 Conflicts of interest 
 
 
A further threat to trust in the doctor-patient relationship are conflicts of interest; in 
particular as arising from the commercialisation of medicine. Commercialised medicine can 
become problematic when the corporations responsible for healthcare delivery are motivated 
by financial gain over patient welfare and direct large quantities of money to investors rather 
than straight into patient care. This can lead to conflicts of interest when companies provide 
professional and financial incentives for doctors to either withhold or prescribe medical care. 
Mechanic (1996) argues that “when significant proportions of the individual doctor’s income 
depend on meeting goals of reduced utilisation, the fiduciary relationship between doctor and 
patient and the credibility of the doctor’s role as the public’s agent are threatened” (p. 179). 
Research by Tringale, Marshall and Mackey (2017) found that approximately 48% of doctors 
in the United States received payments from pharmaceutical companies to promote their 
products.  This conflict of interest may make patients more likely to question whether doctors 
are prescribing treatment in their best interests over treatment that ultimately rewards the doctor 
regardless of whether this is the most evidence-based, patient-centered option available. This 
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threat to trust is exacerbated by arrangements such as ‘gag rules’ that prohibit doctors from 
openly discussing these terms with patients (Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 1995; Pear, 1995). 
 
How exactly AI might tackle this conflict of interest is unclear for there is a lack of 
research on this topic. However, presumably AI would not be susceptible to professional nor 
financial incentives given that they do not have the same personal interests as humans. This 
might suggest that AI’s reliability in prescribing treatments in patients’ best interests surpasses 
the reliability of human doctors. Nevertheless, that is not to say that AI are not vulnerable in 
some other way. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where programmers are incentivised 
by, for example, pharmaceutical companies to bias AI to prescribe certain treatments over 
others. Although AI would be subject to rigorous ethical scrutiny before being rolled out to 
patients, the possibility of algorithmic bias is never eliminated. Indeed, it is not clear that AI 
can be programmed without bias.34 However, for the purposes of our argument, it seems 
plausible that replacing doctors with AI will minimise the human vulnerabilities that make 
doctors susceptible to at least professional and financial incentives. In turn, this might allow 
for more transparency around what prescriptions are made, and patients may, to offer an 
example, have access to all kinds of analytics around the AI’s prescription history. Although 
this may mitigate – though not eliminate – conflicts of interest between doctor and patient and 
increase the likelihood that patients receive the appropriate care, the inevitable presence of bias 
should be a key consideration when considering replacing human doctors with AI. 
 
 
3.3.3 Reduced clinical interaction time 
 
 
In addition to economic incentives, we also see pushes towards resource efficiency 
within the GP clinic (Topol, 2019; Mechanic, 1996). A result of this can be that doctors are 
pressured to reduce clinical interaction time to fit more appointments into their schedule. This 
 
34 Programming bias is not the only form of bias present in AI; biases resulting from data input may exacerbate 
demographic health disparities. As Straw (2020, p. 1) explains, “when a narrow demographic dominates a 
discipline the domain develops with this one group’s needs, perspectives and understandings in mind. Medicine 
lacks the perspectives of women, racial/ethnic, and sexual and gender minorities… and this has been at the 
detriment of their health outcomes”. 
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is a change that often occurs at the expense of the doctor-patient relationship. As Mechanic has 
argued, qualities such as trust can only be properly cultivated within this relationship over 
periods of time. Adequate consultation time allows for better doctor-patient communication 
including increased opportunities for patients to discuss concerns and for doctors to respond, 
as well as increased opportunities for both doctor and patient to exchange feedback. If patients 
feel that they are being rushed in and out of appointments, these opportunities for effective 
communication will suffer and trust is likely to be thwarted. 
 
I am not as concerned about the implications of reduced clinical interaction time for 
trust so much as the implications for health outcomes. The Royal College of GPs reported that 
standard ten minute GP appointments are “unfit for purpose” and should be extended to at least 
fifteen minutes to allow doctors to manage complex health conditions and meet the various 
needs of different patients (Wardle, 2019). Wardle cites Professor Helen Stokes-Lampard – 
chair of the Royal College of GPs – who explains that “it’s increasingly rare for a patient to 
present with just a single health condition, and [GPs] cannot deal with this adequately in ten 
minutes… GPs want to deliver truly holistic care to our patients, considering all the physical, 
psychological and social factors potentially impacting on their health… but this depends on us 
having more time to spend with patients, and the resources and people to allow us to do this”. 
 
There are two approaches AI might take to address the consequences of reduced clinical 
interaction time upon health outcomes. By doing so, AI are becoming more reliable at securing 
good health and are also replacing the need for patient trust. The first approach assumes a 
clinical paradigm representative of the current system whereby patients attend a physical 
consultation at a GP clinic. Research shows that in the United States, doctors spend an average 
of fifteen minutes with their patient during each consultation, and that of these fifteen, nine are 
spent entering data into their electronic health record (Pratt, 2018): if the role of the doctor is 
to be automated by systems with a greater capacity to multitask, such a division between tasks 
– and the resulting implications for consultation times – would be minimised. As AI is 
conversing with a patient about their experience of their illness, it can be simultaneously 
recording this information without having to suspend the conversation. Such multitasking can 
maximise the limited time AI and patient may have together. 
 
AI has already been deployed in a supplementary capacity to support doctors in this 
area: in addition to freeing up doctors’ time, it has also enabled healthcare providers to better 
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“… collect, store, reformat, and trace clinical data, as well as develop personalised assessments 
and plans” (Deliberato, Celi and Stone, 2017, e24) thus increasing the rate of positive health 
outcomes. We can extend this argument to appreciate how – in replacing human doctors – AI 
might also manage other routinisable documentation such as note-taking and clinical 
administration that currently monopolise doctors’ limited time (and contribute to physician 
burnout, a problem that will be further explored in chapter four; Lin, Mahoney and Sinsky, 
2018; Houlton, 2018). Although there may exist further reasons why doctors are unable to 
dedicate undivided attention to patients during shortened clinical encounters, AI assuming 
responsibility for administrative tasks that dominate clinical interactions is one means by which 
the rate of positive health outcomes can be improved and the need for trust eliminated. 
 
The second approach AI might take to this problem assumes that a physical clinic is no 
longer necessary for all GP appointments. If primary care is to undergo automation, the need 
for a physical location at which patients must present themselves becomes less crucial. It may 
be the case that patients attend virtual appointments from home or work; an outcome of which 
may be that appointments can – in theory – be as long or short as required. Patients may also 
be able to have as many interactions as necessary to address their presenting complaint.35 Of 
course, an inability to accurately anticipate what AI consultations will look like makes it 
difficult to outline exactly how AI might address this problem. This is a limitation 
acknowledged in chapter one. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to presume that virtual GP 
consultations via AI won’t be as time-pressured as current consultations due to strains on 
resource efficiency. Longer consultations should enable AI to better assess and treat its 
patients, thus improving its reliability at achieving greater positive health outcomes and further 
demonstrating that trust in one’s doctor is unnecessary to this end.36 
 
In this section, I have presented opportunities for AI to increase the reliability of 
positive health outcomes across these three settings where trust is already compromised in the 
doctor-patient relationship. I have done this with the intention of further highlighting not only 
 
35 Within reason; it seems plausible to presume that unrestricted access to GP consultations would lead to 
overuse of healthcare. 
36 Presumably the nature of some appointments would deem it inappropriate for the consultation to take place 
virtually. For example, patients may need physically examined or require a small procedure. Instances like these 
illustrate the need for physical GP clinics to still exist, although the question of whether appointments such as 
these can still be conducted by AI is the subject of further research.  
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the capabilities of AI but also how AI replacement relieves the need for trust in one’s doctor. 
However, even if this trust is conceptually redundant, patients may still feel that they cannot 
practically engage with AI without it. The next section will explore the idea that patient distrust 
in AI may thwart its potential to reliably achieve positive health outcomes. 
 
 
3.4 Distrust as a challenge for AI 
 
 
Firstly, it is anticipated that AI will encounter resistance from both patients and doctors 
as it is integrated into the GP clinic. Fan et al. (2018) argue that a lack of trust in new 
technologies – specifically, artificial intelligence – is the foremost barrier to routine use. A 
recent survey investigating people’s reactions to AI and robots in healthcare showed that 54% 
of respondents were willing to engage with these technologies for their healthcare needs (PwC, 
2016). However, consistent with Fan et al., when asked what they believed to be the 
disadvantages of these technologies, 47% of respondents identified a lack of trust (particularly 
with regards to clinical decision-making and treatment planning) as a major drawback. 
 
As previously established, AI cannot embody trust as encapsulated interest.37 Whilst 
describing this notion of trust earlier in this chapter, I discussed how the interests and 
motivation of the person being trusted are often considered significant in determining whether 
a person is trustworthy (Hardin, 2002; see also Hatherley, 2020; Jones, 1996; Baier, 1986). 
This understanding of trust proves problematic for AI as they cannot hold any kind of interests 
nor motivation – at least, not in the same sense that humans do. It is therefore reasonable for 
patients to distrust AI, and my intention here is not to refute that. Rather, my intention is to 
reiterate how trust is extraneous for the purposes of good health and is superseded by reliability. 
Patients distrusting AI is therefore only significant if such distrust interferes with AI’s 
reliability in achieving positive health outcomes. 
 
One argument might be that distrust becomes problematic if patients refuse to engage 
with AI on account of its lack of trustworthiness. Without sufficient engagement (for example, 
 
37 Although unspecified, trust as encapsulated interest is presumably the type of trust respondents in Fan et al.’s 
study are referring to. 
51 
 
accurate and adequate communication of symptoms), AI cannot gather enough data to generate 
accurate diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Whilst a comprehensive overview of how 
we might approach this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, Fan et al. (2018) present a 
framework outlining how we might curtail public resistance to increased implementation of AI 
in healthcare. 
 
A further challenge for AI is a lack of moral responsibility with regards to clinical 
errors. In healthcare, doctors have a fiduciary obligation to perform the tasks that are 
normatively expected of them; however, this obligation may be less straightforward for AI 
given that AI is not an appropriate subject of moral responsibility (Hatherley, 2020). By this, 
Hatherley means that we cannot hold AI accountable if it fails to meet this fiduciary 
obligation.38 For example, if AI were to incorrectly diagnose an ill patient who then 
deteriorated and died, it would seem unfitting to place the blame – at least in the moral sense 
– on the AI. Instead, such blame would fall to, say, the programmer or supervising clinician.39 
As Hatherley (p. 6) explains, “trusting a clinician generates a moral responsibility on behalf of 
the clinician, while trusting an AI system generates a moral responsibility on behalf of 
seemingly anyone but the AI system”. This inability to attribute moral responsibility to AI in 
the GP clinic means that patients are unable to hold anyone accountable. This is a ‘not knowing’ 
that may erode trust in the doctor-patient relationship as well as the wider healthcare profession 
(Hart, 2017). 
 
I am sceptical that AI’s circumvention of moral responsibility is problematic in and of 
itself, for any failing to meet fiduciary obligations would arise from flawed algorithms or 
incorrect data input/processing rather than intent. There is a clear difference between 
investigating the cause of an adverse event and finding someone to blame.40 The issue is that 
 
38 Whilst we could still hold AI accountable on some level, doing so is riddled with challenges such as being 
unable to penalise, reprimand, or seek compensation for any damages or harm (Doshi-Valez and Kortz, 2017; 
Hart, 2017). 
39 However, this distribution of blame is not straightforward either owing to the plurality of individuals involved 
in programming and design. For further discussion, see Braun et al. (2020) and Hart (2017). 
40 Although AI cannot be held morally responsible, legal accountability may still – to some extent – be resolved 
through regulatory frameworks. At present, AI regulations are scarce because humans are still held to be the 




to investigate the cause of an adverse event or to address flawed algorithms or incorrect data 
input/processing – necessary interventions if we are concerned with positive health outcomes 
– requires an understanding of how AI works. To better understand why this presents a 
significant problem, I introduce the third (though interrelated) challenge to trusting AI: 
transparency. 
 
Transparency – one of the three components of trust (Nundy, Montgomery and 
Wachter, 2019) and a core ideal of patient-centered medicine (see chapter two) – may 
undermine trust with patients through its nature as a ‘black-box’. As discussed in chapter two, 
AI algorithms are characteristically opaque systems that generate output (i.e. clinical 
diagnostics and decision-making) from input (i.e. patient data) without explaining how it 
travelled from one point to the other (Braun et al., 2020; Price II, 2018; see also Felzmann et 
al., 2019; Pasquale, 2015). Research indicates that the more transparent algorithms are, the 
more likely trust is to be reinforced (Braun et al., 2020; London, 2019; Nundy, Montgomery 
and Wachter, 2019; Lee and See, 2004). In contrast, when algorithms do not reveal the nature 
or source of its output, this trust is compromised. Compromised trust can lead patients to 
suspect that they are being misled, manipulated, or simply that the recommendation is not 
evidence-based. As a result, they may disengage and withhold valuable data necessary for AI 
to achieve good health outcomes.  
 
Braun et al. (2020) and Nundy, Montgomery and Wachter (2019) have said that if we 
can design AI to explain and account for their clinical decisions, we should expect to see an 
increase in user trust. Whilst increased transparency does not change AI’s capacity for moral 
responsibility, it seems plausible that an ability to investigate why clinical errors have been 
made would facilitate patient engagement. However, improving AI transparency is highly 
unlikely given the increasing complexity of these algorithms. This leaves us in a situation 
where “… either responsible clinicians refrain from using potentially beneficial, powerful but 
complex and somewhat opaque tools or we rethink attributions of responsibility and liability”. 
 
Valez and Kortz, 2017). However, as AI capabilities continue to improve and they come to be used more 
autonomously (for example, replacing humans in the role of the doctor), this lack of regulations highlights a 
severe shortcoming. If we are to automate the role of the doctor, there are good reasons to establish regulatory 
frameworks to hold AI legally accountable for clinical errors with a view to service improvement and future 
error minimisation much in the same way that humans are. 
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Researchers such as Felzmann et al. (2019, p. 10) side with the latter, suggesting that patients 
be more “realistic” in their expectations of transparency and review what it means to be able 
to trust in a machine. Although this suggestion may to some extent mitigate the implications 
of the transparency problem, it comes at the expense of principles of explainability central to 
patient-centered medicine (see chapter one). This potential loss warrants further consideration. 
 
If there exists no feasible nor foreseeable option to increase the transparency (and 
corresponding moral responsibility) of AI, do there remain ways to preserve patient 
engagement? As I have stated, patients cannot trust in AI, but that does not mean patients 
cannot rely on AI. The solution may be finding a way to help patients understand both the 
difference between trust and reliability and the relationship each of these concepts have with 
the end of good health. With particular regard to the lack of transparency – and as was discussed 
in chapter two – patients may also feel that an output (that is, a diagnosis or treatment 
recommendation) is sufficient to have their needs met. As a result, they may not demand further 
explanation as to how AI arrived at that conclusion. If AI’s lack of transparency bears no 
implication for the realisation of good health outcomes, patient preference may be sufficient 
for the purposes of patient-centered medicine.41  
 
 I have briefly introduced three ways in which distrust might challenge AI replacement 
with regards to the doctor-patient relationship. Ultimately, we need to ask whether these 
challenges are significant enough to reject the replacement thesis. I have argued that whilst it 
is reasonable for patients to distrust AI on account of its inability to embody trust as 
encapsulated interest, this distrust is insufficient to frustrate moves to replace human doctors 
with AI. This is because reliability is instead what is at stake regarding the achievement of 
positive health outcomes. The inability of patients to trust in AI therefore only becomes 
problematic when this distrust impedes their willingness to engage. 
 
The remaining, interrelated issues of moral responsibility and transparency both present 
practical challenges highlighting two limitations of AI: an inability to be held accountable for 
clinical errors and an inability to explain clinical recommendations. At present, it appears that 
 
41 Another response to the transparency problem might be that human decision-making and problem-solving 
processes are not entirely transparent either. In the interests of avoiding repetition, I will not restate this 
argument here. However, it can be found in section 2.3.3 of chapter two. 
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the only legitimate way to address these challenges (as prescribed by patient-centered 
medicine) is if patients do not have a preference to understand why certain clinical 
recommendations have been made. Otherwise, it seems that we are faced with the choice of 






Trust is instrumentally desirable in the doctor-patient relationship. As a value-laden 
concept that is informed by (sometimes competing) ideas around reliability and 
motivation/interests, many of the tensions explored in this chapter have been around whether 
we can trust a doctor who demonstrates one but not the other. If we are to consider replacing 
human doctors with AI, how we define and understand trust holds implications for AI which 
may be relied upon to produce an expected outcome (that is, improve health) but cannot meet 
the conditions of trust as encapsulated interest. 
 
It is plausible that AI does not need to be trusted to replace humans in the role of the 
doctor. If the absence of trust bears no practical consequence for the quality of care that patients 
will receive, I argue that we are best to challenge ideas of trust as encapsulated interest and 
instead focus on reliability of performance. An issue with this is that AI’s inability to embody 
trust as encapsulated interest may make patients uneasy about conferring their medical needs 
and vulnerabilities to a machine and thus result in a lack of engagement. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued how the instrumental value of trust may be reducible to 
reliability and demonstrated how current threats to trust in the doctor-patient relationship 
present opportunities for AI to increase reliability in securing positive health outcomes. I have 
argued that the black-box problem is the main challenge we face in AI replacement as its 
implications for moral (and legal) responsibility and transparency present practical difficulties 
related to patient engagement. These problems will need to be sufficiently addressed before AI 




The following chapter will explore the extent to which AI can fulfil a third and final 















































 In response to the idea of replacing human doctors with AI, it is reasonable to question 
AI’s capacity for empathy. Empathy is regarded as a central, defining aspect of the doctor-
patient relationship, and in its absence, it is expected that fewer positive outcomes will be 
achieved. In this chapter, I argue that although empathy’s therapeutic value seems 
unambiguous, we cannot dismiss the idea of AI replacement without identifying exactly why 
empathy is valuable. Only once we have ascertained this can we assess the feasibility of 
replacing human doctors with AI vis-à-vis empathy. 
 
 To make this argument, I first establish a preliminary working account of empathy that 
recognises two different dimensions: the cognitive (whereby an individual infers the mental 
state of another) and the affective (whereby an individual shares in the emotional state of 
another). I then proceed to ascertain the apparent value of empathy in the doctor-patient 
relationship as well as factors which may contribute to its absence. With the intention of 
maximising the positive outcomes of empathy and minimising, if not eliminating, the negative, 
I amend my working account to define empathy by its cognitive dimension. At the same time, 
I acknowledge that we cannot dismiss the potential value of its affective dimension without 
tangible evidence. In light of this absence of evidence, I present two studies demonstrating how 
AI might be programmed to cognitively empathise with its user(s) in such a way that appears 
affective, thus accommodating both dimensions of empathy in the instance that the affective 
dimension is instrumental to therapeutic outcomes. Finally, I anticipate and respond to moral 
objections to this ‘performance’ of affective empathy and conclude that if we are primarily 
concerned with how the doctor-patient relationship can best secure positive health outcomes – 
and given that there appears to be no correlation between good health and the authenticity of 
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4.1 A working account of empathy 
 
 
Empathy is notoriously difficult to define. Broadly, we might understand it as the ability 
to share the feelings of another. However, Baron-Cohen (2003) separates empathy into two 
different dimensions: a cognitive dimension and an affective dimension. The cognitive 
dimension is the setting aside of one’s own perspective so as to try to infer the mental state of 
another (a process that Herrera-López et al. have described as “more controlled and conscious”; 
2017, p. 1)42 whereas the affective dimension is an individual’s emotional response to that of 
another. 
 
 Baron-Cohen’s definition is echoed in further accounts of empathy found in the 
literature.43 Whilst accounts of the affective dimension of empathy (see, for example, Morse et 
al., 1992) correspond closely with Baron-Cohen’s, other authors have expanded upon what the 
cognitive dimension represents. For example, the cognitive dimension has been framed as the 
ability to put a label on another’s feelings from an objective point of view (Morse et al., 1992). 
Bondi (2003, as cited by Jeffrey, 2016, p. 448) describes this as “… imaginatively enter[ing] 
the experiential world of another without losing an awareness of its difference from one’s 
own”. Neumann et al. (2012) call cognitive empathy a process of ‘detached concern’; an idea 
that played a significant role in the work of Carl Rogers – the founder of humanistic psychology 
– who believed that a purely affective-driven empathy risked “… over-identifying with the 
patient which then may distort understanding and threaten the therapeutic process” (Rogers, 
1961, as cited by Jeffrey, 2016, p. 447). These descriptions all reflect Baron-Cohen’s cognitive 
dimension of empathy. 
 
 
42 The cognitive dimension is often spoken of as ‘role-taking’ or ‘decentering’ (see, respectively, Mead, 1934; 
Piaget, 1932). Modern psychology has also drawn parallels between empathy and ‘theory of mind’ (see 
Wellman, 1990; Astington, Harris and Olson, 1988). 
43 For example, see Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter (2011), Batson (2009), and Mercer and Reynolds (2002). 
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 There is also significant overlap between empathy and the concept of compassion 
(Jeffrey, 2016). To briefly illustrate the similarities, Strauss et al. (2016, p. 16) define 
compassion as “… feeling for a person who is suffering and being motivated to act to help 
them”. Seppälä et a. (2017) and Kanov et al. (2004) further describe compassion as comprised 
of processes of noticing, feeling, and responding. These processes suggest that empathy and 
compassion might be used interchangeably. However, there are inconsistencies in how each 
term is defined in the literature; inconsistencies that become relevant when we consider how 
similar concepts can produce vastly different outcomes. 
 
 The working account of empathy that I adopt is based upon the framework of Baron-
Cohen (2003). Baron-Cohen’s distinction between the affective and cognitive dimensions of 
empathy proves valuable for my later analysis of the extent to which AI can behave 
empathetically. Preceding this, I will outline the benefits of empathy within the doctor-patient 




4.2 An overview of empathy in the doctor-patient relationship 
 
 
 Like trust, empathy is widely held to be an integral part of the doctor-patient 
relationship (Topol, 2019; Hart, 2018; Scales, 2016; Coplan and Goldie, 2011; Mercer and 
Reynolds, 2002; Halpern, 2001). In this section, I outline the benefits, harms, and limitations 
of empathy so as to build a holistic picture of its true value in this relationship. A major 
challenge I encountered during this research was knowing whether the studies I have cited used 
the same definition of empathy adopted as my working account. To address this potential issue, 
I have – to the best of my ability – only cited studies that appeal to an understanding of empathy 
that fits with the definition outlined in the previous section (i.e. as involving the affective and 
cognitive dimensions). The studies cited all used means of self-report (e.g. questionnaires and 
Likert scales) and qualitative interviewing to measure empathy. 
 
 Howick (2019) has described empathy as “… the most popular and arguably the most 
evidence-based” of therapies within healthcare. Research shows that empathy contributes to 
more satisfying clinical relationships and helps the patient to feel understood and respected 
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(Derksen et al., 2018; Hojat et al., 2011; Pollak, 2011). Empathy also plays a role in patients’ 
ability to manage anxiety and stress (Derksen et al., 2015; van Osch et al., 2014; Mercer, Watt 
and Reilly, 2001). The presence of empathy in the clinical relationship also correlates with an 
increase in patient participation and education which leads to a greater likelihood of achieving 
positive health outcomes (Halpern, 2001). A study by Rakel et al. (2009) even found that 
patients recover faster from the common cold when their doctor behaves empathetically. 
 
 There is also evidence to suggest that a lack of empathy in the doctor-patient 
relationship can have a negative impact on patients. Patients are more likely to feel 
disappointed and overwhelmed in the absence of empathy and may stop seeing their doctor if 
expectations of empathy are unmet (Derksen et al., 2017). Doctors who are unempathetic have 
even been found to deter patients from seeking medical care when they need it (Butler, Pill and 
Stott, 1998). In Illness, the Cry of the Flesh, Havi Carel remarks that “[t]here are many things 
about illness; the lack of empathy hurts the most” (2008, as cited by Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter, 
2011, p. 381). Indeed, Baron-Cohen believes that ‘evil’ can be scientifically defined as an 
absence of empathy (2003, as cited by Bloom, 2016). 
 
 Despite the findings that have been listed, empathy is shown to decline amongst doctors 
as they progress throughout their careers. This is a phenomenon that often begins as early as in 
medical school (Topol, 2019; Chen et al., 2007; Bellini and Shea, 2005; Hojat et al., 2004). 
O’Rourke (2014) reports how empathy significantly decreases in the third year of medical 
school when “initially eager and idealistic students” start seeing patients. It is furthermore 
argued that empathy is a highly demanding requirement of doctors. Cowley (2006, as cited by 
Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter, 2011, p. 381) describes how doctors are expected to be “… skilled 
technicians… and [emphasis added] able to respond to every individual patient on a profound 
subjective human level”. Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter (2011) add that if empathy is to be viewed 
as a requirement of doctors, then another attribute will need to be sacrificed to make room for 
it. Such a point makes us consider exactly what attributes are essential to the role of the doctor 
and which might be desirable albeit inessential. 
 
 There are many theories that attempt to explain the deficit in empathy among doctors. 
One theory may be that it is difficult for empathy to coexist with high levels of cynicism 
reported in doctors (Testerman et al., 1996; see also Hojat et al., 2009). Cynicism – defined as 
“… a contemptuous disbelief in sincerity of motives” (Testerman et al., p. S43) – is suspected 
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to develop in doctors as a product of powerlessness experienced during medical training 
(Sheehan et al., 1990). Specifically, Testerman et al.’s ‘professional identity’ model proposes 
that cynicism is a result of “… the harsher aspects of the professional socialization process, a 
phase that corresponds with the student’s struggle to develop a professional identity while 
surviving demanding academic and clinical challenges in a complex and ambiguous ethical 
environment” (p. S43). Cynicism might thus function as a coping mechanism for medical 
students which is carried forth into their subsequent professional work despite its interference 
with empathy. 
 
 In a study investigating the disparity between doctors’ and patients’ expectations of 
empathy during the clinical encounter, Derksen et al. (2018) identified several additional 
factors that help explain why empathy might be deficient in GPs. One of these pertains to the 
way in which the GP practice is organised. For patients, practice organisation becomes 
problematic when they interact with healthcare assistants who treat them defensively and as 
though they are under interrogation. For doctors, difficulty expressing empathy is encountered 
when patient consultations are interrupted by things such as emergencies or telephone calls 
(see also Scales, 2016). 
  
For an empathetic relationship to develop, there also needs to exist a sense of 
connectedness between doctor and patient.44 Patients report struggling to connect when traits 
such as arrogance, apathy, and/or inauthenticity are present in their doctor. Patients tend to 
infer these traits through doctors’ non-verbal communication (for instance, when doctors do 
not make sufficient eye contact). Doctors report struggling to connect with patients when they 
feel that patients are not making enough of an effort to reciprocate or if they do not trust their 
doctor enough to open up to them. Unsurprisingly, doctors find it especially difficulty to behave 
empathetically towards patients who are generally unpleasant in their demeanor. Failure to 
connect thus contributes to a lack of empathy on behalf of the doctor. 
 
Another factor is time pressures. When interviewed by Derksen and colleagues, patients 
explained that they felt empathy could only be genuinely conveyed when the doctor was not in 
a rush. However, due to ever-shortening consultation times, opportunities for unhurried 
 
44 We might understand this sense of connectedness to represent rapport (Derksen et al., 2018), which is said to 
play a central role within the affective dimension of the therapeutic alliance (see chapter one). 
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consultations are decreasing. Doctors agree, adding that overloaded work schedules, full 
waiting rooms, and excessive bureaucratic procedures play a significant role in reduced 
consultation times and thus reduced opportunities to convey empathy. These findings were 
further supported by Hart (2018) and Scales (2016). As Hart points out, when doctors are 
operating under narrow time constraints, “… basic human empathy is sidelined in favor of the 
objective aspects of care – better an unhappy patient who lives than a happy one who dies”. 
 
Finally, Derksen et al. found that doctors’ individual capacities play a significant role 
in the expression of empathy within the clinical relationship. Circumstances under which 
doctors might find it more difficult to communicate empathetically include when they are 
feeling physically unwell (e.g. ill or fatigued) or when they are distracted by personal issues. 
Fuchsman (2015) also proposes that doctors’ ‘empathic accuracy’ is important, noting that 
different individuals will have different levels of perceptiveness and other skills that enable 
them to better understand those with whom they are trying to empathise. This seems consistent 
with the idea that empathy is a skill that one learns and develops over time (Halpern, 2001). 
  
Further studies show that doctors can fail to exhibit empathy if they are suffering from 
what is commonly known as burnout (Topol, 2019; Rotenstein et al., 2018; Bloom, 2016; 
Shanafelt et al., 2016; Scales, 2016; Block et al., 2013; Bhutani et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 
2010; Halbesleben and Rathert, 2008). Burnout refers to feelings of emotional exhaustion, 
depersonalisation, and lack of a sense of personal accomplishment (Maslach and Leiter, 2016). 
It is also described as “… the index of dislocation between what people are and what they have 
to do… represent[ing] an erosion in values, dignity, spirit, and will” (p. 17). It can be measured 
by increased rates of medical errors, lower rates of patient satisfaction, and decreased 
professional work effort (amongst others; Shanafelt et al., 2016; West et al., 2009; Halbesleben 
and Rathert, 2008). Cole and Carlin (2009, p. 1414-1415) have suggested the cause of burnout 
to be that doctors are operating within “technocentric, dehumanised, and financially driven 
environment[s]… [which] can limit the ability of physicians to live up to ideals, which in some 
individuals creates a cognitive dissonance that leads to cynicism, disillusionment, self-doubt, 
dis-ease, and a retreat from ideals”. 
 
Wallace, Lemaire and Ghali (2009) report rates of physician burnout to sit between 25-
60% (see also Wolfe and Unti, 2017; Mata et al., 2015; Block et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 
2010). As a result of burnout, doctors are more likely to emotionally distance themselves from 
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patients and practice what is described as a more biomedical style of medicine (Shapiro, 2011). 
This, in turn, can have an adverse effect on patient care (Bhutani et al., 2012), as this detached, 
‘objective’ approach competes with the modern framework of patient-centered medicine, 
where an emphasis is placed upon healing through understanding the patients’ personal 
experience (Stewart et al., 2006). 
 
There is also a relationship between empathy and burnout known as ‘compassion 
fatigue’. According to Bhutani et al. (2012), compassion fatigue refers to a condition 
encompassing both burnout and secondary traumatic stress; that is, when the suffering of a 
patient negatively impacts doctors’ emotional well-being (see also Gleichgerrcht and Decety, 
2013; Bride, Radey and Figley, 2012; Figley, 2002). Hutchinson (2011, p. 95-96) anecdotally 
illustrates the experience of compassion fatigue: 
 
I had just left the intensive care unit where I had seen an obese woman in her 30s with diabetes, 
wounds that were not healing following surgery, and acute renal failure for which we were 
dialysing her. I am afraid I could see no hope in her situation… and I was left with a heavy 
feeling from which I was trying to escape. Was I well? Definitely not… I had a sense that what 
I was doing was not working… it is emotionally exhausting to persist in doing what deep in 
your heart you believe is not working and will not work… and so I took the only avenue that I 
thought could distance myself from my pain – depersonalisation. I continued going through the 
motions treating the next patient and the next patient as if they and I were machines, not people. 
 
Through this account, Hutchinson demonstrates how the emotional impact of 
compassion fatigue led him to suppress his empathetic response. This, in turn, led to a decline 
in empathetic behaviour.  
 
 Based on concerns similar to those outlined in the present section, Tate (1994) argues 
that doctors’ having empathy – at least in its affective form – is unfeasible. Similar sentiments 
have been expressed by Gleichgerrcht and Decety (2013). In their effort to be sufficiently 
empathetic, Tate claims that doctors merely acknowledge the presence of patients’ emotions; 
the performance of empathy, if you will. Susskind and Susskind (2016) support this idea of 
performativity and describe doctors as exaggerating or simulating empathy as an expectation 
of their role.45 
 
 
45 It is perhaps worth noting that Tate does not suggest that doctors refrain from performing empathy as the 
illusion can still reap the benefits outlined at the beginning of this section.  
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 Despite the documented value of empathy within the doctor-patient relationship, 
empathy among doctors is declining. Several factors contribute to this, with some researchers 
even arguing that (presumably affective) empathy is an unfeasible expectation of doctors in the 
present healthcare system. In light of these difficulties, I present a reconceptualisation of 
empathy that claims that empathy should be understood only by its cognitive dimension. This 
is in contrast to Baron-Cohen’s (2003) understanding of empathy as necessarily comprising 
both a cognitive and affective dimension. The reconceptualisation of empathy as an entirely 
cognitive process may minimise empathy’s harms for doctors whilst maximising its therapeutic 
value within the wider doctor-patient relationship. 
 
 
4.3 Reconceptualising empathy by its cognitive dimension 
 
 
In the previous section, I outlined the apparent importance of empathy in the doctor-
patient relationship. However, research also indicates that an empathetic doctor may cause 
harm. For example, clinical detachment may better enable doctors to perform difficult tasks 
that an empathetic approach might dissuade them from. As Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter (2011, 
p. 381) frame it, “a doctor who flinches as he makes an incision will be a worse surgeon – even 
if a better human being – than one who effectively dissociates himself from the feeling that he 
is cutting flesh… even if [empathy] shows the student’s essential humanity, it does not show 
that he will be a good doctor” (p. 381). Moreover, it seems plausible that adopting a less 
empathetic approach would reduce rates of compassion fatigue in doctors. These are but two 
examples of arguments that endorse a clinical approach characterised by emotional detachment 
over one characterised by empathy. 
 
Paul Bloom adopts this position in his 2016 book, Against Empathy. Bloom is critical 
of a model of empathy known as the emotional contagion model. As developed by Hatfield, 
Cacioppo and Rapson (1993), the emotional contagion model of empathy describes how an 
individual’s emotions and associated behaviours can trigger parallel emotions and behaviours 
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in others.46 Indeed, this model overlaps significantly with Baron-Cohen’s model of affective 
empathy, differing in that Hatfield and colleagues’ model foregrounds the behavioural 
component. For example, to empathise with another, an individual must first imitate that person 
(e.g. if the other person is frowning, they will frown too). This mimicry then activates a 
corresponding emotional response (e.g. feeling angry). This emotional contagion can be both 
conscious and unconscious. 
 
One of the reasons Bloom believes empathy to be problematic is that – similar to the 
conclusions drawn by sources above – it involves the individual becoming too emotionally 
involved in the suffering of others and, by consequence, risking negative outcomes such as 
burnout (via what has been described in section 4.2 as compassion fatigue). In his book, Bloom 
(loc. 2025) speaks with Christine Montross – a surgeon – who offers her take on empathy from 
a medical perspective: 
 
If, while listening to [a] grieving mother’s raw and unbearable description of her son’s body in 
the morgue, I were to imagine my own son in his place, I would be incapacitated. My ability to 
attend to my patient’s psychiatric needs would be derailed by my own devastating sorrow. 
Similarly, if I were brought in my ambulance to the trauma bay of my local emergency 
department and required immediate surgery to save my life, I would not want the trauma 
surgeon on call to pause to empathise with my pain and suffering. 
 
Montross’ account further illustrates how empathy can prove harmful for both doctor 
and patient. 
 
Bloom further opposes empathy because it can incline an individual to make biased 
moral judgements. It is easier to empathise with those who we perceive as similar to ourselves, 
or who we perceive as more attractive, vulnerable, or unthreatening, than those who are not. 
Although we may value the welfare of everyone on an intellectual level, it is difficult – if not 
 
46 Although Bloom defines empathy itself as “… the act of coming to experience the world as you think 
someone else does” (loc. 342), he also extends his understanding to include what Adam Smith would define as 
sympathy: the capacity to “… place ourselves in [another’s] situation… and become in some measure the same 
person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in 
degree, is not altogether unlike them” (loc. 345). 
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impossible – to empathise with everyone. This is a perspective shared by Prinz (2011) who 
deems empathy unfit for moral judgement and even harmful.47 
 
In response to the problems of burnout and biased judgements, Bloom argues that we 
should embrace a more intellectual understanding of empathy. According to Bloom, “… if I 
understand that you are in pain without feeling it myself, this is what psychologists describe as 
social cognition, social intelligence, mind reading, theory of mind, or mentalizing. It’s also 
sometimes described as a form of empathy – ‘cognitive empathy’ as opposed to ‘emotional 
empathy’” (loc. 350). This revised definition involves understanding what another is feeling 
without experiencing it yourself; what Baron-Cohen and others describe as the cognitive 
dimension of empathy. For Bloom, cognitive empathy is preferable for making moral decisions 
– such as those prevalent in healthcare – as it engages reasoning, critical thinking, cost-benefit 
analyses, and other skills that are more likely to lead to favorable outcomes. 
 
Bloom does not believe that a focus on cognitive empathy detracts from other valued 
behaviours associated with affectivity. He believes social interactions – such as those between 
doctor and patient – to be vehicles for attributes such as kindness, composure, intelligence, and 
what he describes as “a more diffuse compassion” (loc. 594). He doesn’t see cognitive empathy 
and these qualities as mutually exclusive; rather, he argues that cognitive empathy still engages 
them albeit in a more distanced and considered fashion. To illustrate the balance between 
cognitive empathy and these qualities, Bloom offers the following experience of his uncle who 
had undergone treatment for cancer: “[My uncle] appreciated when doctors listened to him and 
worked to understand his situation; he resonated to this sort of ‘cognitive empathy’. He 
appreciated as well those doctors who expressed compassion and caring and warmth. But what 
about the more emotional side of empathy? Here it’s more complicated. He seemed to get the 
most from doctors who didn’t feel as he did, who were calm when he was anxious, confident 
when he was uncertain. And he was particularly appreciative of certain virtues that have little 
 
47 Kochetkova (2015) posed the question of whether humans or machines are better at ethical decision-making. 
Similar to Bloom, she describes how humans can rely on their intuition to make these decisions, often incurring 
the consequence of bias. Authors such as Haidt (2001) also raise how – even when consciously attempting to 
make an ethical decision based upon logic – humans often deceive themselves into pursuing what is in their own 
self-interests. Machines, on the other hand, are able to “… methodically calculate the best course of action based 




directly to do with empathy, such as competence, honesty, professionalism, and certainly 
respect” (loc. 2065). This account further underlines how a synthesis of cognitive empathy and 
compassionate traits may help patients to navigate the stresses and unknowns of healthcare. 
 
Bloom’s recommendation that doctors pair cognitive empathy with such behaviours is 
similar to Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter’s (2011) recommendation that doctors prioritise 
‘etiquette’ over affective empathy. Etiquette – comprising of qualities such as kindness, 
respect, professionalism, and general politeness – would still enable doctors to interact with 
patients in such a way that accommodates their experiences, desires, and values, but that avoids 
the disadvantages of affective empathy. “[Etiquette] may seem a very minimal requirement,” 
they write, “But, in fact, it is specifically with basic courtesy that doctors frequently struggle… 
in medicine, politeness is not just of ethical importance but is also pragmatically and financially 
significant” (p. 383). 
 
Bloom argues that we should reject affective empathy in favour of cognitive empathy. 
In doing so, we can minimise consequences such as burnout whilst also enhancing skills such 
as moral reasoning. The emotional warmth associated with empathy need not be lost with the 
affective dimension: Bloom believes that doctors should still practice traits such as kindness, 
care, and respect. This is similar to Smajdor, Stöckl and Salter’s recommendation that doctors 
emphasise etiquette when interacting with patients. 
 
Having established a normative framework for empathy that avoids the limitations of 
Baron-Cohen’s account, the question then becomes whether AI can express empathy to the 
extent required (that is, to achieve – or surpass – the positive health outcomes associated with 
the doctor-patient relationship). The following section presents two studies that illustrate how 
we might program machines to achieve this goal. 
 
 
4.4. Empathetic AI: Two illustrations 
 
 
 Thus far, this chapter has outlined the supposed value of empathy to the doctor-patient 
relationship as well as its harm. I have drawn upon the work of Bloom (2016) to put forward a 
reconceptualisation of empathy that underscores the cognitive dimension instrumental to its 
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value within this relationship and disposes of the affective dimension that appears to contribute 
to some of its harms. This reconceptualisation has left us with a revised working account of 
empathy characterised by its cognitive dimension. 
 
 Although I am ultimately arguing for cognitive empathy, the fact that the affective 
dimension is still associated with empathy’s therapeutic benefits means that we cannot assume 
that the affective dimension is entirely unimportant. This is for the reason that research 
demonstrating empathy’s therapeutic benefits tends not to differentiate between cognitive and 
affective empathy. Indeed, it is unclear what such a study would look like. I am therefore 
interested in how AI can cognitively empathise whilst still appearing to affectively empathise 
with a view to securing these positive outcomes. 
  
 In the interests of good health, I argue that we ought to replace human doctors with AI. 
Although this argument is primarily motivated by AI’s epistemic superiority, this might also 
be advantageous for aspects of patient-centeredness within the doctor-patient relationship. 
With regards to empathy, there is reason to believe that AI may address the reasons contributing 
to a deficit in medicine in the first place. Empathy is said to be declining amongst doctors 
owing to factors such as cynicism, practice organisation, lack of connectedness, time pressures, 
individual capabilities, and compassion fatigue. By removing the human component – and all 
of the corresponding cognitive and emotional vulnerabilities – from the role of the doctor, 
factors such as cynicism, individual capabilities, and compassion fatigue will no longer present 
significant risks to empathy. However, it is more difficult to predict how organisational factors 
(e.g. interruptions) and other time pressures will be affected if AI came to replace human 
doctors – at least without a clearer picture of what the GP clinic will look like in the wake of 
AI replacement. It is also difficult to anticipate the impact upon the sense of connectedness 
between doctor and patient. Derksen et al. (2018) argue that a sense of connectedness is 
necessary for an empathetic doctor-patient relationship to develop: whilst research indicates 
that rapport of some kind between machines and humans is not unfeasible, achieving the same 
sense of connectedness in the robot-patient relationship – relative to the traditional doctor-
patient relationship – will prove challenging. The question might become to what extent this 
sense of connectedness is necessary for empathy; a question Derksen and colleagues could not 




 This section investigates the practicality of empathetic AI. If AI is to assume the role 
of the doctor and the interpersonal expectations that accompany such a role, it will need to be 
able to behave empathetically – that is, empathise cognitively in such a way that resembles 
affective empathy – better than, or to the same extent as, human doctors. Here, I present two 
studies that demonstrate how empathetic behaviour within these parameters is programmable. 
 
 
4.4.1 Empathetic behaviour via an iCat robot 
 
 
To demonstrate that machines can be perceived as behaving empathetically towards 
humans, Leite et al. (2013) orchestrated a scenario whereby an iCat robot observed two humans 
engaged in a game of chess and responded to the moves.48 The iCat was programmed to 
comment on every move made but only to behave empathetically towards one of the players 
(the ‘companion’) and to behave neutrally towards the other. When a move was made, the iCat 
inferred the companion’s affective state through perspective taking (i.e. considering the chess 
match from their point of view). The iCat then assumed the inferred affective state and used 
that to determine an empathetic behavioural response. 
 
 Once a move has been made, the iCat used a chess heuristic function to appraise the 
new board position.49 The robot then interpreted this appraisal as though they were about to 
play their own move. As Leite et al. explain, this appraisal was the result of “… the robot’s 
affective state based on the mismatch between an expectation of the next state of the game 
(expected value) and the real evaluation (sensed value) of the new board position” (p. 253). 
The expected value is generated from the historic record of previous values acquired from chess 
heuristics whereas the sensed value is another term for the appraisal the iCat was conducting 
 
48 The iCat is a robotic research platform developed by van Breemen, Yan and Meerbeek (2005) for the purpose 
of studying social human-robot interaction. The iCat – modelled after a domestic cat – lacks mobility but can 
generate different facial expressions to communicate emotions. 
49 According to Korf (1995, p. 489), “a heuristic evaluation function is a mapping from a state of a problem to a 
number. These numbers are then used to guide a search for a goal, by choosing options that lead to situations 
with the best chance of success. For example, in a computer program to play chess, a heuristic evaluation 
function is applied to a board position, and returns a numerical estimate of the strength of the position for one of 
the players relative to the other”. 
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at that moment. Through this mechanism, the iCat could produce any of nine different affective 
states. Table 1 (below) presents the nine affective states available to the iCat including 
examples of verbal comments the iCat could express. 
 
Table 1. Description of the possible affective sensations experienced by the iCat, with examples of the 
verbal comments of the robot for both conditions. In the neutral utterances, the comments only vary 
depending on ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ sensations. The utterances are sometimes combined with the 
name of the players either at the beginning or end of the sentence (Leite et al., 2013, p. 253). 
 
Affective state Meaning Examples of verbal utterances 
 Empathic Neutral 
Stronger reward Better than expected “Great move! Even better 
than I was expecting!” 
“Good move.” 
Expected reward As good as expected “Nice move, you played 
what I would have 
played!” 
“You played well this 
time.” 
Weaker reward Not as good as expected “I believe you could have 
played better.” 
 
Unexpected reward Good, unexpected “You played very well.”  
Unexpected punishment Bad, unexpected “Oh… I wasn’t expecting 
that move…” 
“This move wasn’t that 
good.” 




Expected punishment Bad, as expected “Don’t worry, you didn’t 
have better options.” 
“Bad move.” 
Strong punishment Worse than expected “You’re making me 





To illustrate these affective states in practice, if the companion were losing and made a 
bad move, the iCat would express the affective state of ‘expected punishment’. ‘Expected 
punishment’ represented the iCat’s accuracy in predicting the companion to make a bad move 
and was conveyed by a verbal expression such as, “Don’t worry, you didn’t have better 
options.” 
 
The nine empathetic responses were accompanied by facial expressions. The iCat 
reflected the companion’s facial expression in its own in an attempt to further convey empathy. 
In returning to the above example, if the companion were losing and made a bad move, the 
iCat would display a low intensity sad expression to behave empathetically towards the 
companion (low intensity because the move was expected). These expressions would change 
to adapt to the game as the companion either recovered or further performed badly. Another 
method of communicating empathy through the iCat’s appearance was eye contact: during the 
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game, the iCat was programmed to display ‘idle behaviour’ whilst the players were 
contemplating their next moves (such as looking with a neutral expression at either the 
chessboard or the players) but to make eye contact with the companion when behaving 
empathetically. 
 
As outlined in Table 1, verbal feedback was an additional way of conveying empathetic 
responses. Thus, after expressing a facial expression in response to a move, the iCat would 
make a verbal comment. These comments would be either an empathic utterance (when the 
iCat addressed the companion) or a neutral utterance (when the iCat addressed the other 
player). Empathic utterances made reference to the inferred affective state of the companion 
whilst neutral utterances indicated the quality of the move without personal judgement. The 
iCat was also programmed to use the companion’s name twice as often than when addressing 
the other player. 
 
Leite et al. (2013) analysed the impact of the iCat’s empathetic behaviours on the chess 
players; specifically, how the chess players perceived their relationship with the iCat following 
these behaviours. The researchers recruited forty participants for their study who, after playing 
a game of chess against another subject and interacting with the iCat, filled out a questionnaire 
and answered several open-ended questions to capture their experience. Leite and colleagues 
used the McGill Friendship Questionnaire – a questionnaire that measures the degree to which 
a friend fulfils the functions present in most friendship definitions (see Mendelson and Aboud, 
1999) – to quantify the influence of empathetic behavior upon the relationship between the 
chess players and the iCat. Leite et al. acknowledged that a friendship could not be developed 
between the chess players and the iCat during their encounter (given that a friendship is a long-
term endeavour and the encounter with the iCat lasted approximately one hour), but 
nevertheless selected the McGill Friendship Questionnaire because they believed that “… by 
analysing the friendship functions individually, some indicators on improving long-term 
interaction between humans and robots can be retrieved” (p. 255).50 The hypothesis was that 
participants cast as the companion (and towards whom the iCat expressed empathetic 
behaviour) would score higher on the friendship functions than the other chess players. 
 
50 As functions such as help, intimacy, reliable alliance, and emotional security are also important for the doctor-
patient relationship, I believe that we can extrapolate findings from Leite et al.’s study for this thesis. 
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Participants’ responses to open-ended questions following completion of the questionnaire 
were also analysed. 
 
Leite et al. found that participants cast as the companion scored significantly higher on 
more friendship functions than the other chess players. Participants from both groups also 
reported that they appreciated both the iCat’s verbal feedback on their moves and the iCat’s 
use of their names. One participant in the companion group even stated that “… [the iCat’s] 
facial expressions and movement[s] made me feel empathy” (p. 257). 
 
The results from Leite et al.’s study demonstrate how participants in the companion 
condition perceived the iCat to behave more empathetically towards them. Such empathy was 
conveyed through verbal utterances and facial expressions representing different affective 
states (see table 1.). These behaviours were valued and participants expressed a willingness to 
interact with the iCat again in future. Leite et al. concluded that this outcome resulted from a 
mix of cognitive and performatively affective dimensions of empathy (perspective taking and 
verbal utterances/facial expressions, respectively), and are confident that these findings can be 
translated to other contexts where empathy is valued (for example, in healthcare).51 
 
 
4.4.2 Empathetic behaviour via a socially assistive robot 
 
 
 Similar to Leite et al. (2013), De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (2017) demonstrate how 
a robot may behave empathetically towards its user. These authors indicate how a socially 
assistive robot operating under an internal framework of cognitive empathy (that is, 
programmed to express cognitive empathy) can simulate affective empathy towards its user.52 
  
 To construct the cognitive dimension of empathy, De Carolis and colleagues 
programmed their robot to recognise and understand the affective state of its user by analysing 
 
51 To clarify, Leite et al. do not claim that the iCat embodied genuine affective empathy; only that the use of 
verbal utterances and facial expressions supported the appearance of such. 
52 De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra define a social assistive robot as a robot that facilitates social interaction in 
humans and may fulfil a companionship role. 
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modalities such as users’ facial expressions, speech, and bodily movements and gestures. To 
use the recognition of facial expressions as an example, De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra drew 
upon the Facial Acting Coding System (Ekman and Oster, 1979, as cited by De Carolis, Ferilli 
and Palestra, 2017) which outlines the six basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise. To identify these different facial expressions, the robot applied a three-
step procedure consisting of face detection, facial features extraction, and facial expression 
classification (for a more comprehensive account of this process, see De Carolis, Ferilli and 
Palestra, 2017). When measured against the Random Forest Classifier – a method of machine 
learning classification (see Palestra et al., 2015, as cited by De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra, 
2017) – the robot achieved a 95.46% success rate for accurate identification of facial 
expressions. 
 
 Having recognised a user’s affective state, the robot must then generate an appropriate 
empathetic response to simulate the affective dimension of empathy. To do this, the robot used 
Dynamic Belief Networks (DBNs; see Jensen, 2001, as cited by De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra, 
2017)53. One of the challenges De Carolis and colleagues encountered when modeling affective 
states is that different states are not separate, isolated phenomena; rather, they “… smoothly 
evolve during the interaction, from one step to the subsequent one, and that the state at any 
time during the interaction depends on the state of the previous turn” (p. 5080). DBNs can 
effectively address this by using probabilities to estimate what affective state the user is 
experiencing at every stage of the interaction. 
 
In many computer systems, empathetic behaviour is triggered only by recognition of 
the user’s affective state. However, De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra strove to enhance the 
conviction of this behaviour (i.e. the conviction of the simulated affective dimension) by 
activating an affective state in the robot. To achieve this, the authors modeled the robot’s 
emotional activation on a theory by Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC; 1988, as cited by De 
Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra, 2017). OCC posits how positive emotions are activated by 
desirable events whilst negative emotions are activated by undesirable events. The authors also 
 
53 A DBN is a formalism (a depiction of a subject in formal mathematical or logical terms) used to represent 
ever-evolving (dynamic) situations that enable a system (e.g. the robot) to simulate probabilistic reasoning to 
manage uncertainties characteristic of naturally-occurring scenarios. The uncertainty in the present context 
would be the user’s changing affect over time. 
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lent from Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s theory (1987, as cited by De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra, 
2017) that positive emotions are activated by the belief that a goal will be achieved whereas 
negative emotions are activated by the belief that a goal is threatened. Through OCC and Oatley 
and Johnson-Laird’s theory, De Carolis and colleagues could simulate an affective state in the 
robot. 
 
The subsequent step was to determine how the robot should behave following 
emotional activation. To do this, the robot must produce an empathetic goal. These goals might 
include consoling, encouraging, congratulating, joking, or calming down. Following 
appropriate selection of a goal, the robot then behaved according to what are termed ‘context-
adapted recipes’ (that is, behavioural blueprints outlining preconditions to the behaviour, the 
effect that the behaviour is intended to achieve, and the physical actions that constitute that 
behaviour). De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (p. 5085) present the following example to illustrate 
how the robot would employ the above steps to ‘empathise’ with its user: 
 
It’s morning and Nicola, a 73 y.o. man, is at home alone. He feels lonely and sad since [it has 
been] a long time since he last saw his grandchildren. Nicola is sitting on the bench in his living 
room, that is equipped with sensors, effectors and [the robot]. After a while Nicola starts 
whispering and says: ‘Oh my… oh poor me…’ 
 
Assuming that it cannot detect Nicola’s facial expression due to his body position, the 
robot would use data collected from Nicola’s voice to trigger the DBN model. The DBN would 
calculate a high probability that Nicola is experiencing a negative affective state. Given its role 
as a social assistive robot, the machine is programmed with the goal of maintaining its user’s 
wellbeing. As Nicola’s level of wellbeing appears to be threatened, the DBN would trigger a 
similar affective state in the robot (emotional activation; see the above models). This simulated 
affective state would then trigger the goal of consoling. The robot’s consequent behaviour 
would be dictated by the behavioural blueprint attached to this goal; specifically, by calculating 
what preconditions are necessary for consoling, what effect consoling is intended to achieve, 
and what physical actions would constitute consoling. By following the ‘context-adapted 
recipe’ for this goal, the robot can ‘empathise’ with Nicola’s plight. 
 
Similar to the outcome of Leite et al.’s (2013) study, findings from research by De 
Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra show that users perceived the robot’s behaviour as empathetic. 
However, there remains ambiguity around expressions of the different dimensions of empathy. 
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The robot appeared to be more successful at communicating cognitive empathy and was less 
successful at communicating affective empathy. In some instances, participants described the 
robot’s attempts at conveying the latter as “inappropriate” (p. 5075). The authors suspect that 
these results may be due to the absence of facial expressions in the robot and suggest that future 
research might address this limitation (amongst others) to obtain more valid results. 
 
In the previous section, I raised the concern of whether AI can express empathy to the 
extent required. In the present context, the extent required describes securing the therapeutic 
outcomes reaped by empathy in the doctor-patient relationship. However, it is uncertain 
whether it is the cognitive dimension of empathy that achieves this, or a combination of both 
the cognitive and affective dimensions. If the latter is the case and affective empathy is 
necessary – at least insofar as it is performed – then AI will need to be able to behave 
empathetically in such a way that satisfies both the cognitive and affective conditions. The key 
word here is behave: given that human doctors’ performance of affective empathy still seems 
to secure the desired benefits, there is little reason to believe that this empathy must be 
genuinely affective. 
 
Both of the studies by Leite et al. (2013) and De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (2017) 
provide promising evidence for the ability of machines to cognitively empathise with users in 
such a way that can be perceived as affective empathy. Remaining questions might regard 
whether there is anything problematic about this deliberate performance of affective empathy. 
Although the performance of affective empathy in medicine is unsurprising, we can imagine 
how patients might intuitively object to the idea that the affective empathy with which their 
doctor is treating them is fake. The following section presents an argument for why AI’s 
performance of affective empathy may not be morally objectionable. 
 
 
4.5 Machinic verisimilitude 
 
 
 In Emotional AI: The Rise of Empathic Media, McStay (2018) defends AI’s ability to 
uphold the cognitive dimension of empathy in such a way that is sufficient for the general 
purposes of empathy. He argues that AI does not have to understand emotion in any affective 
way “… to sense, classify, process, learn, amend algorithms and interact” with humans (p. 22). 
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Key to his reasoning is the idea of machinic verisimilitude: the way in which technology 
appears to understand how we think and feel even if that understanding is not genuine. 
According to McStay, it is unimportant whether or not this ‘empathy’ is authentic; rather, what 
matters is whether we can still reap value from its illusory appearance.54 
 
 As previously discussed, the idea of an AI that behaves empathetically without the 
corresponding internal experience might be said to reflect the behaviour of some human 
doctors (see the performance of empathy; Susskind and Susskind, 2016; Tate, 1994). It is also 
an accurate description of the outcomes obtained by Leite et al. (2013) and De Carolis, Ferilli 
and Palestra (2017) in their respective studies. However, on an intuitive level, patients might 
object to this twofold. For one, the illusion of affective empathy may not be seen as sufficient. 
We might suppose that the therapeutic value of empathy is made possible by at least the 
perception that this empathy is real. For another, if patients are to be convinced by the illusion 
of affective empathy, then we might ask whether this illusion constitutes deception. 
 
 The first potential objection to machinic verisimilitude concerns how patients seeing 
through the illusion of affective empathy may undermine its benefits. The argument might 
follow that if patients realise that the empathy expressed by AI is not affective in nature – i.e. 
that the AI is not sharing in their emotional experience – then the positive outcomes of an 
empathetic doctor-patient relationship will be thwarted. 
 
I suspect that the illusion of affective empathy via AI will not be meaningfully different 
(in terms of instrumental benefits such as those outlined in section 4.2) from that of a human 
doctor. As Suchman et al. (1997) highlight, the communication of empathy is key. A doctor 
may be empathetic (in the cognitive and/or affective sense), but unless they are perceived to be 
so, the patient may not characterise the interaction as such. If we imagine an AI that is capable 
of cognitively empathising with a patient – that is, identifying and understanding what 
emotions the patient is likely feeling – and responding appropriately, then there seems to be 
little difference between the illusion of affective empathy as purported by AI and that by a 
 
54 A similar argument has been advanced by Danaher (2019) called ‘ethical behaviourism’. In brief, ethical 
behaviourism theorises that “… robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively 
equivalent to other entities that are commonly agreed to have significant moral status” (p. 1). Under this model, 
if AI consistently behaves in the same way as human doctors, then patients are obligated to treat it as such. 
76 
 
human doctor. Indeed, findings by Leite et al. (2013) and De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (2017) 
support the hypothesis that the illusion of affective empathy expressed by AI can still be 
instrumentally valuable. 
 
Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that AI will one day appear more capable at the 
detection and expression of emotions than humans themselves (what is termed ‘robotic 
sensing’; Susskind and Susskind, 2016). Consistent with research previously cited, Herzfeld 
(2015, p. 36) describes how AI can be programmed to “… look for words and phrases that 
signify a particular emotion… a computer may also show an emotional response – drooping 
ears, a sound like a laugh or a cry, a gaze from artificial eyes or a smile – and it is remarkable 
how little it takes for us to believe it is genuine”. Likewise, Ayanoglu and Sequeira (2019, p. 
47) outline that empathy in particular can be expressed through “… words, tone of voice, facial 
expressions, posture, and physical gestures”. In their work on human-computer interaction, 
Ayanoglu and Duarte (2019) explain how a user’s emotional experience with a machine may 
be as important as the machine’s functional performance. 
 
One might challenge these assumptions by pointing out that the patient has good reason 
to suspect the authenticity of AI whereas little reason to suspect that of a human. This leads us 
to directly consider the implications upon empathy’s benefits if patients are to see through this 
illusion. We know that a lack of empathy in the doctor-patient relationship can lead to patients 
feeling disappointed and overwhelmed (see Derksen et al., 2017), but what is important about 
these findings is that these feelings arise when expectations of empathy are unmet. This seems 
to suggest that these negative outcomes might be avoided if expectations around empathy are 
less idealistic. The adjustment of these expectations might rely upon patients developing a more 
reasonable understanding of not only what to expect from their doctor and the role of the doctor, 
but whether there exists a discrepancy between the two. 
 
Another perspective is that seeing through the illusion of affective empathy can itself 
be beneficial for patients. In Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), MIT professor 
Joseph Weizenbaum describes creating an early AI chatbot called ELIZA who simulated a 
human psychotherapist. Weizenbaum had invited his secretary to test the program and was 
shocked when she asked him to leave the room so that she could interact with ELIZA alone. 
His secretary’s response demonstrates how it can be possible for humans to not only accept the 
illusion of affective empathy (i.e. despite knowing that it is simulated) but that ‘playing along’ 
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(so to speak) can introduce further advantages such as increased anonymity and privacy. These 
are crucial values in a clinical context.55 As Gunkel (2012, p. 5) later observed, “… ELIZA 
created the most remarkable illusion of having [been] understood in the minds of many people 
who conversed with it. People who know very well that they were conversing with a machine 
soon forgot that fact, just as theatergoers, in the grip of suspended disbelief, soon forget that 
the action they are witnessing is not ‘real’”. Moreover, patients may prefer to interact with AI 
when it comes to disclosing sensitive information. We may not always describe a patient as 
benefitting from a doctor who empathises with them to the extent that their share in their 
suffering or embarrassment; empathy is not a protective factor across all contexts (Lather, 
2008). 
 
 The second anticipated objection to machinic verisimilitude claims that if patients are 
misled into believing that their AI doctor is affectively empathetic then AI may be committing 
an act of deception (see also Luxton, 2014). As Kagan (2007, p. 37) put it, “… the computer is 
merely superficial charm over a deep emptiness, a charm that thus becomes manipulative and 
calculated”. One way to respond to this is to argue that machinic verisimilitude does not 
constitute deception. To deceive is to lead someone to believe something that is not true; thus 
deception can only occur if AI are behaving empathetically under the guise that such empathy 
is affective in nature. Machinic verisimilitude does not claim that AI have the capacity to 
affectively empathise – only that they give the appearance of such. If patients understand this, 
it is inaccurate to claim that these AI would be deceptive.56 Of course, such a response raises 
questions around what happens if patients do not understand the nature of AI empathy and 
whose responsibility it is to educate them. These are questions for further research to address. 
 
Machinic verisimilitude presents a means by which AI may practice the cognitive 
dimension of empathy whilst appearing to embody the affective dimension. In doing so, 
patients may still be able to enjoy the outcomes of empathy that maximise the therapeutic value 
of the doctor-patient relationship and contribute to good health. Machinic verisimilitude 
 
55 It is worth acknowledging that in the present example, Weizenbaum’s secretary may have been reluctant to 
openly engage with ELIZA in the presence of her employer. She may not have had the same reservations about 
interacting with a human psychotherapist in privacy. 
56 Not only does this mean that AI are not deceptive, but that human doctors performing affective empathy are. 
Arguably, this is a more serious moral breach. 
78 
 
presents one response to the concern raised in section 4.4 whereby it is unclear whether the 
authenticity of affective empathy is necessary to achieve these outcomes. 
 
Two potential objections challenge machinic verisimilitude: firstly, that patients seeing 
through AI’s illusion of affective empathy would undermine such benefits, and secondly, that 
such an illusion constitutes deception. I have responded to the first objection by arguing that 
there appears to be little difference between the empathetic performance of AI versus the 
empathetic performance of a human doctor, and that moreover, patients may actually benefit 
from knowing that this empathy is not affectively authentic (as demonstrated by ELIZA). In 
response to the second objection, I have highlighted how the illusion of affective empathy vis-
à-vis AI is not deceptive in any morally objectionable sense if there is transparency around 
AI’s capacity (or lack thereof) for affective empathy. Of course, these responses raise further 
questions and future research might seek to resolve these. In spite of this, I believe that 
machinic verisimilitude presents a valuable framework for how we can manage the unknowns 






 Although empathy is widely agreed to be a key component of the doctor-patient 
relationship, which dimensions of empathy – that is, cognitive or affective – are instrumental 
to the therapeutic outcomes is less clear. It has been argued that cognitive empathy is superior 
to affective empathy on account of its maximisation of features such as moral reasoning and 
mitigation of harms such as burnout. However, because research has not studied cognitive and 
affective empathy as separate phenomena, it cannot be assumed that affective empathy has no 
place in securing the therapeutic outcomes associated with the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
 In replacing human doctors with AI – and in light of the aforementioned uncertainty – 
the immediate question seems to be how we can program AI to behave empathetically in such 
a way that satisfies both the cognitive and affective dimensions. Research by Leite et al. (2013) 
and De Carolis, Ferilli and Palestra (2017) have demonstrated how it may be possible for AI 
to adopt an internal framework of cognitive empathy that is expressed affectively, conveying 
the idea that it is indeed affectively empathising. However, problems arise from this approach: 
79 
 
namely, that the performance of affective empathy is morally objectionable. Mechanic 
verisimilitude – that is, the way in which a machine appears to understand what we think and 
feel even if that understanding is inauthentic – offers a framework defending the performance 
of affective empathy. Mechanic verisimilitude enables us to describe how the replacement of 
human doctors with AI may not be disadvantageous nor impermissible with respect to the value 
of empathy. 
 
 Although empathy appears to be instrumental to therapeutic outcomes associated with 
the doctor-patient relationship, it is unclear which dimensions of empathy contribute to this. 
This chapter has indicated how AI might uphold these different dimensions in such ways that 
challenge conventional expectations of empathy but that do not detract from the end goal of 
good health. Furthermore, it has highlighted the need for empirical research on the role of 
empathy in the doctor-patient relationship to differentiate between the cognitive and affective 
dimensions. By studying the two as separate phenomena, we can identify exactly which parts 
of empathy are responsible for positive outcomes and use that information to better assess the 





























In this thesis, I have made a case for the ethical plausibility of the replacement of human 
doctors (GPs) with artificial intelligence. I call this the replacement thesis. In defending the 
replacement thesis, I have tackled two predominant questions: to what extent are aspects of 
patient-centered medicine associated with the doctor-patient relationship – in particular, 
communication, trust, and empathy – necessary for good health? And in assuming the role of 
the doctor, can artificial intelligence uphold these aspects to the extent required to achieve this 
outcome? I argued that the parts of communication, trust, and empathy that are instrumental 
towards the realisation of good health need not depend on humans and that – for the most part 
– AI can uphold these aspects to the extent required to achieve this outcome. I therefore 
concluded that once certain issues are resolved, it is ethically plausible to replace human 
doctors with AI. 
 
In this chapter, I will present a final summary of my defense of the replacement thesis 
as well as acknowledge a number of limitations of my inquiry. I will then identify some 




5.1 The replacement thesis 
 
 
I approached the replacement thesis through the normative lens of patient-centered 
medicine. Patient-centered medicine strives to move beyond traditional biomedical models of 
medical practice and places significant emphasis on the integration of patients’ values and 
preferences into clinical decision-making. Associated with patient-centered medicine is the 
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therapeutic alliance: a framework for maximising positive health outcomes within the doctor-
patient relationship that is comprised of a goal-oriented dimension, an action-oriented 
dimension, and an affective dimension. I explored the aspect of communication through the 
goal- and action-oriented dimensions and the aspects of trust and empathy through the 
affective. The value of these aspects were then assessed according to their instrumentality 
towards the end of good health. To conduct this assessment, I adopted a deflationary approach 
which sought to separate these aspects from their perceived moral character to better identify 
their utility towards the positive health outcomes associated with the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
 
To a certain degree, I also had to approach the replacement thesis in a general and 
abstract way. An inability to accurately predict what AI doctors will look like (that is, what 
form they will take; what sort of clinical consultation will take place etc.) meant that I could 
not engage with arguments that depend upon specific details of its development. I thus 
proceeded by examining challenges to AI replacement that are expected to be relevant to a 
range of ways that AI doctors could emerge, meaning that several topics were excluded from 
my inquiry. This limitation will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
In the following, I will summarise key conclusions from this thesis; namely, to what 
extent the aspects of communication, trust, and empathy are necessary requirements for a good 
doctor-patient relationship and its corresponding health outcomes, and how these aspects need 
not depend upon there being human doctors for their realisation. 
 
Communication is a valuable tool within the doctor-patient relationship for both 
achieving good health outcomes and preserving tenets of patient-centered medicine. I argue 
that – through the use of mixed-initiative, text-based dialog, didactic strategies, and dynamic 
user modeling – communication can be upheld by AI to the extent required to achieve these 
outcomes. However, before AI assumes the role of the doctor, it should be able to navigate 
communicative challenges regarding goal-setting and decision-making processes within the 
clinical encounter. The problem of black-box medicine poses a particularly difficult challenge 
as it requires us to position ourselves with either patient-centered medicine and its emphasis 
on explainability or epistemically-superior yet unexplainable systems. One way to resolve this 
issue may be to recognise that traditional medical practices are not always explainable either 
and that it is unreasonable to demand more of AI. It may be that explainability is a reasonable 
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trade-off against the patient-centered ideal for the epistemic superiority that has prompted the 
replacement thesis in the first place. 
 
Trust and empathy are also important aspects of patient-centeredness within the doctor-
patient relationship, however – unlike communication – their instrumentality towards the 
desired end of good health depends upon how they are conceptualised. For example, I have 
argued that trust is only valuable in the clinical setting as reliability. With respect to this 
account of trust, AI can produce positive health outcomes more reliably than human doctors. 
Therefore, whilst AI may be unable to embody trust as a moral concept (that is, share the same 
motivations and interests as its patients), this form of trust is redundant for clinical purposes. 
However, this inability to embody trust as a moral concept may make patients uneasy about 
conferring their medical needs and vulnerabilities to a machine. As a result, we may observe a 
lack of patient engagement which may restrict AI’s access to patient data and subsequently 
compromise these health outcomes. Similar to the case with communication, AI’s black-box 
nature also presents practical difficulties regarding moral and legal responsibility and 
transparency. I have claimed that AI’s inability to be held morally responsible is a nonproblem 
and that the challenge presented by its algorithmic opacity might be resolved by recognising 
that patients may not desire absolute transparency and that current medical practices are not 
transparency either (see chapter two). Furthermore, the development of regulatory frameworks 
to hold AI legally accountable for clinical errors appears necessary before AI can replace 
humans in the role of the doctor. 
 
Likewise, an empathetic doctor-patient relationship is only valuable towards the end of 
good health under a certain framework. We have reason to believe that only the cognitive 
dimension of empathy is necessary to secure positive health outcomes; however due to a lack 
of research investigating the respective effects of both the cognitive and affective dimensions, 
we cannot assume that the affective dimension is entirely unimportant. Thus, at least until 
further research is conducted, AI will need to behave both cognitively and affectively 
empathetic in order to replace human doctors. I argued that AI can achieve this by adopting an 
internal framework of cognitive empathy and merely behaving affectively. I then anticipated 
and responded to concerns that there is something morally objectionable with this 
‘performance’ of empathy. I did this by concluding that there appears to be little difference 
between the empathetic performance of AI versus the empathetic performance of a human 
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doctor, and that there may actually be therapeutic value to patients knowing that AI cannot 
empathise with them in any real affective sense. 
 
Ultimately, the parts of communication, trust, and empathy within the doctor-patient 
relationship that are instrumental towards the realisation of good health need not depend on 
human doctors. Although AI replacement raises important considerations such as how to 
preserve patient engagement and navigate the moral and practical tensions associated with 
black-box medicine, I argue that – for the most part – AI can uphold these aspects to the extent 
necessary to produce positive health outcomes compatible with patient-centered medicine. 
Once certain issues are resolved, it is ethically plausible to replace human doctors with AI. 
 
It requires clarification that when I argue for the plausibility of the replacement thesis, 
I am not claiming that AI replacement is practically plausible (at least in its current state). 
Although I am optimistic that this will be the case – and indeed, sections of my argument are 
reinforced by applied AI (for example, see the illustrations of dynamic communication and 
behavioural empathy in chapters two and four) – this inquiry has been primarily theoretical. I 
have defended the replacement thesis at a fundamental level; that is, whether it could ever work 
at all. Implementation challenges are secondary – though, granted, there is an overlap between 
implementation problems and fundamental problems in that an implementation problem can 






 In this section, four key limitations will be raised: an inability to predict what AI 
replacement will look like, an inability to predict how AI capabilities will continue to advance, 
an absence of pre-existing literature on AI replacement, and the restriction of my inquiry to 
only three aspects of patient-centered medicine within the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
Perhaps the greatest limitation identified from the outset is that we cannot accurately 
predict what AI replacement will look like. Although studies indicate that AI are likely to adopt 
the form of some sort of virtual interface (such as an embodied conversational agent), these 
indications are speculative. An implication of this uncertainty is that I have had to approach 
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this thesis in a more abstract way – that is, refraining from engaging too closely with arguments 
that hinge upon these details – which detracts from the applicability and specificity of my 
conclusions. This uncertainty limits my argument to: whilst we should generally seek to replace 
human doctors with AI, when it comes to its practical implementation, there may be more to 
consider that may count against its use. This is a caveat I recognised above when I described 
the overlap between fundamental and implementation problems. Ultimately, we cannot 
accurately assess the plausibility of the replacement thesis without this information. This is an 
area for future research to address.57 
 
 A further limitation is that – to some extent – the plausibility of the replacement thesis 
depends upon the continued development of AI capabilities. Although I have endeavored to 
conduct this inquiry within the parameters of AI’s current capabilities (parameters that are both 
difficult to pinpoint and rapidly expanding), it has been an implicit though reasonable 
assumption that these capabilities will improve and that the replacement thesis will be 
strengthened. Whilst research indicates that both the technical and interactive performances of 
AI will undergo further improvement, an inability to accurately quantify these advancements 
implicates my argument. Whilst I cannot claim that AI replacement is practically possible, I 
can claim that AI replacement will be possible if these developments occur. 
 
Similarly, the fact that little research on the replacement of human doctors with AI was 
available for me to engage with meant that, at times, my argument lacked empirical detail. This  
absence of literature meant that I had to work cautiously on the basis of plausible inferences 
from the research there was, as well as extrapolating from other relevant research. As the 
previous paragraph stated, it is only through the continued research and development of AI that 
the replacement thesis can advance from conceptually plausible to practically plausible. 
 
Finally, given greater scope, I would have covered more aspects of patient-centered 
medicine than just communication, trust, and empathy. Further aspects might include (but not 
be limited to) respect, dignity, or autonomy. I chose to focus on the aspects of communication, 
trust, and empathy because they present an immediate intuitive challenge to AI replacement; 
 
57 Alternatively, this uncertainty may be interpreted as a strength of my argument. Because I have attempted to 
allow for different outcomes of AI replacement, my conclusions may be more adaptable to how the replacement 
thesis will unfold. 
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in particular, the aspects of trust and empathy which ostensibly require an emotional or, at least, 
moral component to their execution. They are also held to be very ‘human’ qualities, further 
underlining the challenge presented to AI. 
 
A running theme in the limitations identified in this thesis is uncertainty. An inability 
to predict what AI replacement will look like or how AI will continue to develop means that 
the plausibility of the replacement thesis rests on several assumptions. An absence of literature 
on AI replacement also means that my research is highly speculative in lieu of lacking empirical 
support. However, these limitations emphasise the novelty of my research and help identify 
directions for further work on the replacement thesis. Indeed, my inquiry should be taken as a 




5.3 Directions for future research 
 
 
 The previous section indicated a number of directions for further research: identifying 
(to the extent possible) what AI replacement may actually look like, identifying (again, to the 
extent possible)  how AI capabilities are likely to improve in the immediate future, and general 
engagement with the replacement thesis in the literature including analysis of further aspects 
of patient-centered medicine that AI will need to uphold to produce positive health outcomes 
associated with the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
 In addition to these areas, future research might also clarify some conceptual matters 
raised in this thesis. A key example is the lack of consensus regarding the respective roles of 
cognitive and affective empathy in securing positive health outcomes. Because it cannot yet be 
demonstrated that affective empathy has no (or sufficient) instrumental value for these 
outcomes, AI must be able to meet the affective conditions necessary to achieve this end. If it 
can be demonstrated that cognitive empathy alone is sufficient for these outcomes, then AI is 
better placed to meet this challenge and the plausibility with which it can secure the health 




 Similarly, a significant problem facing AI replacement is black-box medicine’s lack of 
explainability and transparency vis-à-vis clinical decision-making. Although this feature of 
black-box medicine is in tension with central tenets of patient-centered medicine, it is unclear 
to what extent patients want explainability and transparency. Patients may not necessarily 
desire the level of explanation prescribed by patient-centered medicine; in returning to the 
hypothetical example presented in chapter two, Theodore may not be interested in 
understanding how nicotine replacement therapy works or why it has been put forward over 
other treatment alternatives. Instead, he may be satisfied with the knowledge that an expert 
source such as AI has deemed it the most appropriate choice given his patient data. If patients 
can be shown the input variables that informed a decision, it is possible that this tension 
between black-box medicine and patient-centered medicine is mitigated and the concern is 
more theoretical than real. Although the subjects of explainability and transparency are already 
receiving more attention in the literature, patients’ perspectives present additional opportunities 
for future research. 
 
Research might also address what the future may look like for human doctors. Given 
the complexity and range of responsibilities in healthcare, it is unlikely that AI replacement 
would completely supersede the need for human doctors (at least in the immediate future). It 
is therefore necessary to ascertain how AI replacement will affect this role. It may well be that 
there are aspects of the doctor-patient relationship unexplored in this thesis that AI cannot yet 
uphold, and humans may need to be available to ensure ethical clinical practice. In a healthcare 
system where human doctors have all but been replaced by AI, we also need to consider how 
to manage patients who request human treatment. Given the emphasis on patient-centered 
medicine, it would be incongruous to refuse patients who would value and prefer the care of a 
human doctor over a machine. 
 
Finally, I have identified that a significant challenge facing the replacement thesis is 
the lack of patient engagement that may arise from distrust in AI. In chapter three, I outlined 
concerns that an absence of trust in AI (arising from its inability to embody trust as 
encapsulated interest and its nature as a black-box) may lead patients to disengage. Such 
disengagement would be problematic because AI can only produce positive health outcomes 
with sufficient input of patient data. Future research could therefore investigate how patient 
engagement with AI can be facilitated so that the necessary information is being exchanged 
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during the clinical interaction and the likelihood of achieving a good health outcome is 
increased. 
 
In the following, I will offer some concluding thoughts on the replacement thesis as 
well as consider what the replacement thesis might mean for the future of the role of the doctor.  
 
 
5.4 Implications and concluding thoughts 
 
 
The ethical plausibility of the replacement thesis entails a handful of implications. For 
one, it indicates that we should be less concerned about the prospect of AI replacement than 
intuition might suggest. It doesn’t seem immediately obvious that replacing human doctors 
with AI will necessarily favour a more biomedical model of healthcare over that of patient-
centered medicine, and anxieties that AI replacement will undermine the ‘humanness’ intrinsic 
to healthcare and the doctor-patient relationship have been challenged. Throughout this thesis, 
I have attempted to identify this sense of humanness by asking: if AI does come to replace 
human doctors, is something ‘human’ missing from the doctor-patient relationship? The 
answer appears to be descriptively yes (by which it is meant that there wouldn’t be a human 
doctor present), however the assumption that this absence is morally problematic is less 
justified. For example, whilst AI replacement results in a loss of the human-human interaction 
that has previously been one of the characterising features of the doctor-patient relationship, 
there is little reason to believe that the robot-human interaction that will take its place will be 
any less effective at fulfilling the communicative purposes that this human-human interaction 
served. I hold that the loss of this sense of humanness is not undesirable in and of itself; only 
if that loss then implicates the resulting health outcomes.  
 
In response to the replacement thesis, I believe that we should start making a slow 
transition towards AI replacement now. This is a position in line with the predictions of 
Susskind and Susskind (2016) in The Future of the Professions. As I raised in chapter one, the 
field of medicine is undergoing increasing automation, and AI is anticipated to be on the 
frontline of this transformation. By recognising and facilitating this transition, we will be better 
placed to address moral and practical issues that will certainly arise from the implementation 
of any new technology. Although I have rejected what we might think of as the 
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‘supplementation thesis’ (that is, the supplementation of human doctors with AI as opposed to 
their replacement), it is reasonable to expect that supplementation will be the first stage of this 
transition. It is likely that we will observe this transition in areas of medicine where AI is 
demonstrably better and where the ‘human factor’ is believed to be less important (for example, 
in medical imaging and predictive modeling). However, the end goal of AI supplementation 
should be complete replacement, and the aim of the present inquiry has been to defend the 
ethical plausibility of this. 
 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the value of current medical practice and the 
doctor-patient relationship at present. Whilst a significant portion of my argument has been 
focused on shortcomings in these areas (for example, the harms associated with an 
unempathetic doctor-patient relationship), the value of medicine as it stands should not be 
understated. I am aware that changing existing professions through the integration of new 
technologies can be difficult, and I hope to have demonstrated why we should support this 
change rather than oppose it. 
 
The replacement of human doctors with AI – what I have termed the replacement thesis 
– is one way we might increase positive health outcomes for patients. However, it is 
questionable whether AI can uphold three aspects of patient-centered medicine assumed to be 
important to the doctor-patient relationship and its corresponding health outcomes: 
communication, trust, and empathy. I have argued that whilst parts of these aspects appear to 
be instrumentally valuable towards the end of good health, they do not depend upon humans 
for their realisation and could instead by provided by AI. Although some areas warrant further 
consideration (namely, the tension between black-box medicine and patient-centered 
medicine), the doctor-patient relationship appears to present an insufficient argument against 
the replacement thesis (at least vis-à-vis the aspects of communication, trust, and empathy). By 
transforming the doctor-patient relationship into, as it were, the robot-patient relationship, we 
may improve patient health outcomes without undermining the therapeutic value of the doctor-
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